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Patterson v. McLean Credit Union: New Limitations
on an Old Civil Rights Statute
The United States Supreme Court in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union 1
drastically limited the reach of a century-old civil rights statute that for two
decades2 had been the principal vehicle by which the Court had expanded the
remedies available to victims of racial discrimination. Previously, in Runyon v.
McCrary,3 the Court held that section 19814 forbids racial discrimination in the
making and enforcing of private, as well as public, contracts. 5 In Patterson
plaintiff alleged that her employer violated section 1981 by subjecting her to
racial harassment in the course of her employment.6 In holding that plaintiff's
1. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
2. In 1968 the Court, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), construed a
statute that originated from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, to reach private
acts of racial discrimination. Jones, 392 U.S. at 413. The Jones Court was construing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982, which provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and con-
vey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982).
Twelve years later, in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), the Court reached the same
result in construing 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a statute that also originated from the Civil Rights Act of
1866. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168-72 & n.8. Section 1981 provides in relevant part: "All persons...
shall have the same right ... to make and enforce contracts.., as is enjoyed by white citizens .... 
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). For the full text of § 1981, see infra note 25.
The Court has stated that "the operative language of both § 1981 and § 1982 is traceable to the
Act of April 9, 1866." Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 439 (1973). For
the text of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, see infra text accompanying note 46.
3. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
5. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 173. Previous Court interpretations had limited the proscriptions of
the nineteenth-century civil rights statutes to discrimination by state actors. See The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). For a discussion of the Civil Rights Cases, see infra notes 57-65 and
accompanying text.
Recently, the Supreme Court decided to reconsider the Runyon holding when it called for rear-
gument of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988) (order calling for reargument).
The Supreme Court itself instituted the reconsideration of Runyon. The Supreme Court did not ask
for reargument on Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), which provided much of the
foundation for the decision in Runyon. See Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168-70 & n.8. Most commentators,
however, believe that the judicial reasoning in Jones also came up for reconsideration. See Blum,
Section 1981 Revisited: Looking Beyond Runyon and Patterson, 32 How. L.J. 1, 9 (1989); Maltz,
Legislative Inaction and the Patterson Case, 87 MICH. L. REV. 858, 858 (1989); Sullivan, Counter-
vailing 4ctivism? Employment Case Evokes Supreme Court Crisis, 24 GONZ. L. REV. 31, 33 (1988-
89). But cf. Farber, Statutory Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, and Civil Rights, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2, 4-6 (1988) (Jones not currently at issue).
The Court's decision to reconsider Runyon was immediately criticized. See Farber, supra, at 2
n.3 (listing newspaper articles criticizing the conservative Court). Justice Blackmun, joined by Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, dissented from the decision to grant reargument of Patterson,
stating, "I am at a loss to understand the motivation of five Members of this Court to reconsider an
interpretation of a civil rights statute that so clearly reflects our society's earnest commitment to
ending racial discrimination, and in which Congress so evidently has acquiesced." Patterson v. Mc-
Lean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419, 1422 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from order calling for
reargument). Justice Stevens, dissenting separately, believed that "some of the harm that will flow
from today's order may never be completely undone." Id. at 1423 (Stevens, J., dissenting from order
calling for reargument).
6. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2369. "Employment claims comprise 77% of all filings under the
statute." Eisenberg & Schwab, The Importance of Section 1981, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 596, 601
(1988).
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allegations of racial harassment by her employer did not state a cause of action
under section 1981, 7 a majority of the Court8 interpreted the statute literally to
prohibit racial discrimination "only in the making and enforc[ing] of con-
tracts." 9 The majority reasoned that the statute's express protections do not
include postformation conduct, including performance of the contract.10
This Note focuses primarily on the Patterson Court's construction of the
"to make and enforce contracts" clause of section 1981 in light of the legislative
and judicial history of the civil rights enactments. The Note argues that Con-
gress intended the making and enforcing contracts clause to cover the terms and
performance of a contract. The Note also argues that the Patterson Court's
strict interpretation of section 1981 is inconsistent both with an established line
of cases that broadly construe the nineteenth-century civil rights statutes and
with current societal values. The Note challenges the soundness of the Court's
fundamental policy arguments supporting its decision. As a result of Patterson,
Congress must amend either section 1981 to include the performance of contract
obligations or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196411 to include broader
remedy provisions like section 1981.
In May 1972 McLean Credit Union hired Brenda Patterson, a black wo-
man, as a teller and file coordinator.1 2 Patterson testified at trial that during the
ten years she worked at McLean her supervisors subjected her to racially derog-
atory statements; 13 that her supervisors assigned her more work than white em-
7. Before reaching the issue of § 1981's application to the present case, the Court unanimously
decided to preserve the Runyon holding on the applicability of § 1981 to private contracts. Patterson,
109 S. Ct. at 2371-72. A majority of the Patterson Court decided to preserve the Runyon holding
solely on the basis of the doctrine of stare decisis, without addressing the issue of whether Runyon
was correctly decided. Id. at 2371 n.1. Justice Brennan, dissenting, contended that "Runyon was
correctly decided, and that in any event Congress has ratified [the Supreme Court's] construction of
the statute." Id. at 2380 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
8. Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White, O'Connor, and Scaliajoined the opinion. Justice Stevens, who had joined in the Court's stare
decisis analysis, dissented from the Court's refusal to apply § 1981 to claims of racial harassment.
Id. at 2395 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
9. Id. at 2372.
10. Id. at 2372-73. The Court reasoned that racial harassment arises after the formation of the
employment contract and "implicates the performance of established contract obligations and the
conditions of continuing employment." Id. The Court further indicated that the right to enforce a
contract granted in § 1981 only protects access to legal process for the resolution of contract law
claims without regard to race. Id. at 2373.
In dissent, Justice Brennan stated that the equal right to make contracts should extend "to
cover postformation conduct that demonstrates that the contract was not really made on equal terms
at all." Id. at 2388-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Justice Brennan's view, a claim of racial harass-
ment is actionable if it demonstrates the imposition of discriminatory terms on the employee, thereby
showing that the black employee was not treated equally in the making of the contract. Id. at 2389
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
11. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1982)).
12. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1144-45 (4th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). Patterson claimed that Robert Stevenson, the general man-
ager and later the president at McLean, informed her at the time he hired her that her white female
coworkers probably would not like working with a black. Id. at 1145.
13. Patterson testified that Stevenson repeatedly told her that "'blacks are known to work
slower than whites by nature.'" Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2392 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing tran-
script). Stevenson also suggested that a white person would do a better job than Patterson. Id.
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ployees, including demeaning tasks;14 and that Robert Stevenson, the general
manager, publicly scrutinized and criticized her.15 In addition, Patterson
claimed that McLean did not offer her training for a higher-level position, pro-
mote her, or inform her of promotion opportunities, 16 and that McLean denied
her routine wage increases. 17
In July 1982, after ten years of employment, McLean laid off Patterson,
although, as Patterson asserted, less experienced white employees kept their
jobs. 18 Patterson brought suit in the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of North Carolina alleging that McLean Credit Union had racially
discriminated against her by harassing her, failing to promote her, and discharg-
ing her, all in violation of section 1981.19 The district court concluded as a
matter of law that a claim for racial harassment was not cognizable under sec-
tion 1981 and refused to submit that claim to the jury.20 The court permitted the
.jury to consider the section 1981 claims for racially discriminatory discharge
and denial of promotion, but the jury found for McLean on both claims.2 1
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
Patterson challenged the district court's refusal to submit hek racial harassment
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing transcript). A former manager testified that when he recommended
a black person for a position at McLean, Stevenson said that he did not "'need any more problems
around here,'" and that he would "'search for additional people who are not black.'" Id. at 2392
n.16 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing transcript).
14. Patterson testified that her supervisors gave her an excessive workload. Id. at 2392 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (citing transcript). Patterson claimed she always received more work whenever
she requested assistance. Id. (Brennan, 3., dissenting) (citing transcript). She was the only clerical
worker whose duties included dusting and sweeping. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing transcript).
When Patterson went on vacation her work accumulated. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing tran-
script). In contrast, when white employees went on vacation, their work was reassigned. Id. (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (citing transcript).
15. According to Patterson, Stevenson critized her more severely than the white employees. Id.
(Brennan, L, dissenting) (citing transcript). She testified that he would stare at her for long periods
while she was working. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing transcript). In staff meetings Stevenson
would discuss white employees' mistakes without referring to a particular individual, but he would
openly criticize Patterson and the one other black employee. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing
transcript).
16. According to Patterson, white employees received training and promotions. Id. (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (citing transcript). In particular, McLean promoted to "Account Intermediate" a
white woman hired two years after Patterson. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143,
1145 (4th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). Patterson claimed that
McLean should have promoted her to a similar position due to her seniority. Id. Patterson further
testified that McLean never informed her about promotion opportunities and that McLean filled
senior positions with white persons without interviewing her for any of these opportunities. Patter-
son, 109 S. Ct. at 2392 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing transcript).
17. Patterson testified that McLean denied her a pay raise after six months of employment that
white employees automatically received. Id. at 2392 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing transcript).
18. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
19. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2369 (district court opinion unreported). Patterson also asserted a
pendent state claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under North Carolina tort law. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. The district court concluded that the employer's behavior was not sufficiently outra-
geous to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress under state law and
directed a verdict for McLean on that claim. Id.
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claim to the jury.22 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding. 23
The court distinguished the broad language of Title VII24 from the "more nar-
row prohibition of discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts" pro-
vision of section 1981.25 The court held that "standing alone, racial harassment
does not abridge the right to 'make' and 'enforce' contracts." '26
Patterson sought review of the Fourth Circuit's decision on her racial har-
assment claim by the United States Supreme Court.2 7 Refusing to construe sec-
tion 1981 "as a general proscription of racial discrimination in all aspects of
contract relations,"'28 the Court affirmed that the section prohibits only racial
discrimination that interferes with either the making or enforcement of con-
tracts.29 The Court limited the interpretation of the statute to the literal mean-
ings of the terms "to make" and "to enforce." °3 0 Because racial harassment in
the workplace arises after the formation of the contract of employment, the
Court concluded that the right to make contracts does not cover such conduct.3 1
The Court further concluded that the right to enforce contracts only ensures the
pursuit of legal remedies free from racial discrimination. 32 Because racial har-
assment on the job did not interfere with Patterson's right to enter into an em-
ployment contract or to enforce its terms, she could not maintain a cause of
action under section 1981 resting solely on McLean's treatment of her during
her employment.33
22. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). Patterson also challenged the court's refusal to submit her
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim to the jury. Id. Patterson further challenged the
exclusion of two witnesses' testimony that supported her employment discrimination claims and
argued that the district court erred by instructing the jury as to her burden of proof on the promo-
tion claim. Id. at 1147.
23. Id. at 1146. The court of appeals also affirmed the district court as to the other three
challenges. Id. at 1147-48.
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). Title VII prohibits "discriminat[ion] against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race." Id. § 2000e-2(a).
25. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). Section 1981 provides in full:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and prop-
erty as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penal-
ties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
26. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1146 (4th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). The Fourth Circuit found no error in the jury instruction
that Patterson had to show she was better qualified than the white employee with less seniority
whom McLean promoted instead of Patterson. Id. at 1147-48. The court held that this burden was
consistent with the disparate treatment proof scheme courts have developed for Title VII actions,
which should apply in a § 1981 claim. Id. at 1147.
27. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2369.
28. Id. at 2372. For a detailed explanation of the Court's opinion, see infra notes 155-72 and
accompanying text.
29. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2372.
30. Id. at 2372-73.
31. Id. at 2373.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2373-74. Considering Patterson's promotion claim under this literal interpretation,
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Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, dis-
sented from the Court's "needlessly cramped" views on section 1981's substan-
tive protections.3 4 The dissenters concluded that section 1981 encompassed
protections against racial harassment that occurs after a contract's formation. 35
The dissenters argued that severe or pervasive racial harassment indicates that
an employer did not enter into a contract in a racially neutral manner.36 The
dissenters concluded that Patterson was entitled to have her racial harassment
claim submitted to a jury.3 7
The Patterson majority did not consider section 198 1's legislative history or
the events leading to its enactment. 38 In 1865 Congress passed the thirteenth
amendment to abolish slavery.39 The amendment contained an enabling clause
that "clothed 'Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for
abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.' ,,40 Recogniz-
ing the need to reinforce the thirteenth amendment, Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.41 One of Congress' primary goals was to eradicate the
the Court concluded that a promotion claim must rise to the level of a new and distinct contractual
relationship between the employer and the employee before it will be actionable under § 1981. Id. at
2377.
34. Id. at 2379 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 2388-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 2389 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 2391-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissenters determined that a jury could have
found for Patterson on her racial harassment claim, id. (Brennan, J., dissenting), and on her promo-
tion claim with proper instructions, id. at 2394-95 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38. See id. at 2388 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court reaches [its] ... conclusion by con-
ducting an ahistorical analysis that ignores the circumstances and legislative history of § 1981.").
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. "'By its own unaided force and effect,' the Thirteenth Amend-
ment 'abolished slavery, and established universal freedom.'" Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)).
In 1862, during the Civil War, the Emancipation Proclamation ordered the freedom of the
slaves in the Confederate states effective January 1, 1863. The Emancipation Proclamation, app. no.
16, 12 Stat. 1267-68 (1862); see H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 253-55
(1982); Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth Amendment (Ch. I,
Great Expectations: The Issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation, Adoption of the Thirteenth
Amendment, and Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866), 12 Hous. L. REv. 3, 4-7 (1975). After the
Union victory in the Civil War, a return to slavery was unforeseeable. H. HYMAN, A MORE PER-
FECT UNION 264 (1975). The 1864 election filled the seats of Congress with a group of Republicans
dedicated to reconstructing the country and shaping the morals of its people. Sullivan, Historical
Reconstruction, Reconstruction History, and the Proper Scope of Section 1981, 98 YALE L.J. 541, 548
(1989). A constitutional amendment embodying the order of the Emancipation Proclamation origi-
nally was proposed in the House of Representatives in 1863, CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 19
(1863) (by Representative Ashley of Ohio), and introduced into the Senate in 1864; id. at 145 (by
Senator Henderson of Missouri). The thirteenth amendment provides:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CONT. amend. XIII.
40. Jones, 392 U.S. at 439 (quoting and emphasizing language in The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 20 (1883)). For the text of the enabling clause, see supra note 39.
41. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-
82 (1982)); see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1865) (bill proposed by Senator Trum-
bull to enforce thirteenth amendment). Southern whites, particularly plantation owners, refused to
abide by the constitutional directive to end slavery. See Sullivan, supra note 39, at 548-49. In 1865
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newly enacted Black Codes,42 state laws designed to oppress blacks by subject-
ing them to "onerous disabilities and burdens, and curtail[ing] their rights... to
such an extent that their freedom was of little value." 43 Congress sought to
eliminate private racial injustices such as the physical punishment of freedmen,
landowners' failure to pay contracted wages, and, in some instances, the killing
of blacks as a means of intimidation.44 During debate on the Act, one represen-
tative stated that the purpose of the legislation was "to secure a poor, weak class
of laborers the right to make contracts for their labor, the power to enforce the
payment of their wages, and the means of holding and enjoying the proceeds of
their toil.' '45
"President Johnson had assigned [General Carl] Schurz the task of traveling through a number of
Southern States for the purpose of gathering information and making observations as to the postwar
conditions to be found in that region." City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 131 n.4 (1981)
(White, J., concurring). Members of Congress received a copy of his report, which detailed the
abuses suffered by freedmen at the hands of white Southerners trying to retain a system of slavery.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 79-80 (1865). The full text of the Schurz Report is reprinted at
S. EXEc. Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1865). Congressmen frequently referred to the Schurz
Report and the matters discussed in the report during the long debates on the Civil Rights Act of
1866. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 30, 39-40, 43, 78-80, 93-95, 1267, 1838-39 (1865-66).
In addition to enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Congress amended the Freedmen's Bu-
reau Act. Freedmen's Bureau Act, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173 (1866) (extended by ch. 135, 15 Stat. 83
(1868); expired by its own terms on July 15, 1969); see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 77, 129
(1865-66). "The Bureau's function was to protect newly freed blacks from being victimized by
whites in such areas as jobs, wages, working conditions, and housing; it was intended to secure
something more than parchment freedom for the former slaves." Buchanan, supra note 39, at 14.
42. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 386 (1982) ("The prin-
cipal object of the legislation was to eradicate the Black Codes, laws enacted by Southern legislatures
imposing a range of disabilities on freedmen." (footnote omitted)); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 39, 474, 516-17, 602-03, 1123-25, 1151-53, 1160 (1865-66). For examples of the codes and the
types of conduct regulated, see H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 118, 39th Cong. 2d Sess. (1865).
43. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70 (1873).
44. The Schurz Report was replete with examples of such injustices. S. EXEc. Doc. No. 2,
39th Cong., Ist Sess. 16-20, 29-30 (1865). Schurz found the prevailing sentiment of white
Southerners to be that "'You cannot make the negro work without physical compulsion.'" Id. at
16. This opinion "naturally produced a desire to preserve slavery in its original form as much and as
long as possible. . or to introduce into the new system that element of physical compulsion which
would make the negro work." Id. at 17. "In many instances negroes who walked away from the
plantations... were shot or otherwise severely punished" to intimidate the freedmen and make them
fear for their lives if they exercised their rights. Id. Landowners also subjected former slaves who
stayed in their employ to abuse:
[M]any attempts were made to .... adher[e], as to the treatment of the laborers, as much
as possible to the traditions of the old system, even where the relations between employers
and laborers had been fixed by contract. The practice of corporal punishment was still
continued to a great extent.... The habit is so inveterate with a great many persons as to
render, on the least provocation, the impulse to whip a negro almost irresistible.
Id. at 19-20 (emphasis added).
General Oliver 0. Howard, head of the Freedmen's Bureau, confirmed and reiterated the find-
ings of the Schurz Report. Howard Report, reprinted at H.R. EXEc. Doc. No. 11, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 22-32 (1866).
45. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1159 (1866) (remarks of Representative Windom)
(emphasis added). Representative Lawrence also commented on the scope of the Act:
It is idle to say that a citizen shall have the right to life, yet deny him the right to
labor, whereby he alone can live. It is a mockery to say that a citizen may have a right to
live, and yet deny him the right to make a contract to secure the privilege and the rewards of
labor.
Id. at 1833 (emphasis added).
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As originally enacted, the first section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
provided:
[A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign
power,... are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and
such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude,... shall have the same
right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and
to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens .... 46
The first right-"to make and enforce contracts"-as well as the third right-
"to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey property"-provided equal
economic opportunities to all citizens.47 The second right-"to sue, be parties,
and give evidence"-ensured all citizens the legal capacity to protect and en-
force the other rights provided. 48 The fourth right-"to full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings"-reinforced the ideal of equality between black and
white citizens.49
After enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Congress further pursued its
goals by adopting two additional constitutional amendments50 and passing the
46. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-
1982 (1982)).
Two early decisions by Supreme Court Justices on circuit involved interpretations of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 that were consistent with the legislative history. In United States v. Rhodes, 27
F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151), Justice Swayne sustained the prosecution of a state
official who had denied a black woman the right to testify. Id. at 786-88. Justice Swayne upheld the
constitutionality of the 1866 Act as a valid assertion of Congress' power under the thirteenth amend-
ment. Id. at 788-94. In the case of In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247),
Chief Justice Chase held that a Maryland apprentice law did not apply to black children as favorably
as to white children and released a young black girl from an unconstitutional "apprenticeship" with
her former owner. Id. at 339-40. Justice Chase held that the Maryland law conflicted with the Act's
right to the full and equal benefit of the laws. Id. at 339.
47. Buchanan, supra note 39, at 15-16. "The historical origins of§ 1981 therefore demonstrate
its dominant concern with economic rights." Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 676
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. Buchanan, supra note 39, at 16. "[T]he rights 'to sue, be parties, give evidence,' and 'en-
force contracts' accomplis[h] ... [nothing more] than the removal of legal disabilities to sue, be a
party, testify or enforce a contract." Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 195 n.5 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting).
49. Buchailan, supra note 39, at 16. "Clearly, the 'full and equal benefit' and 'punishment'
clauses guarantee numerous rights other than equal treatment in the execution, administration, and
the enforcement of contracts. In this sense § 1981 ... is broadly concerned with 'the equal status of
every "person." Goodman, 482 U.S. at 671 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471
U.S. 261, 277 (1985)) (emphasis in original).
50. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV; id. amend. XV. These two amendments furthered the goal of the
thirteenth amendment to make the black race equal to the white race by removing legal disabilities
associated with the condition of slavery. Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the
Thirteenth Amendment (Ch. II, Through the Looking Glass: The Thirteenth Amendment's Backward
Trip Through Time), 12 Hous. L. REv. 331, 332 (1975). The fourteenth amendment "secured state
and national citizenship for all races ..... provided that no state shall 'deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law' .... [or] 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.'" Id. at 332-33 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV) (footnotes
omitted). By proscribing any denial of the right to vote based on" 'race, color, or previous condition
of servitude,'" the fifteenth amendment eliminated an additional attribute of slavery. Id. at 333
(quoting U.S. CONsT. amend. XV). Both amendments contained enabling provisions authorizing
1990]
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Civil Rights Acts of 1870,51 1871,52 and 1875. 53 The debates on the fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments revealed that a majority of Congress believed that its
power to legislate in the area of civil rights derived from these amendments, and
not from the earlier thirteenth amendment.5 4 Civil rights opponents capitalized
on this lack of concensus to break down the efforts of the civil rights proponents
to enact laws enforcing the amendments' goals. 55 After enactment of the four-
teenth and fifteenth amendments, judicial and congressional actions began to
erode the foundation of the civil rights scheme.
5 6
The most damaging judicial blow to the civil rights statutory scheme came
Congress to enact laws to enforce the amendments' proscriptions. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2).
51. Enforcement Act, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C §§ 1971,
1981, 1987-91 (1982)). The Enforcement Act's main purpose was to effectuate the fifteenth amend-
ment's prohibitions against racial discrimination in voting. Buchanan, supra note 50, at 334.
52. Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 333
(1988); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (1982)). The dominant theme of the Ku Klux Klan Act was
enforcement of the fourteenth amendment. Buchanan, supra note 50, at 336. The Act had a provi-
sion that "created a civil cause of action for deprivations, under color of state law, of rights secured
by the Constitution and federal laws." Id. (citing Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871)
(currently codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1982))). Another provision of the Act specifi-
cally applied to private conduct by punishing private criminal conspiracies that deprived persons of
the equal protection of the law and creating a cause of action for victims of such conspiracies. Id.
(citing Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, § 3, 17 Stat. 14 (1871) (currently codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§ 333 (1988))).
53. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875). Through the 1875 Act, Congress
sought to eliminate racial discrimination in public places. Buchanan, supra note 50, at 340. The
original bill proposed by Senator Sumner of Massachusetts met with strong opposition for nearly five
years and the basis of Congress' constitutional authority to pass the Act shifted repeatedly between
the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 340-45.
54. By its express language, the thirteenth amendment prohibits only slavery, not racial dis-
crimination. See Buchanan, supra note 50, at 332-34.
55. Before the Reconstruction efforts were completed, the comprehensive structure built by
Congress had begun to erode. See Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50
MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1336-37 (1952). "[The loose, unprecise language that had been written into
the constitutional additions, particularly the Fourteenth Amendment, permitted the enemies of na-
tionalized civil rights to persuade the strict constructionists of the judiciary that the amendments did
not say what the framers had meant them to say." Id. at 1337; accord Buchanan, supra note 50, at
331-32.
56. The first judicial decision to affect the civil rights legislation adversely was the Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment
protected only national citizenship and that national citizenship did not include any fundamental
individual rights. Id. at 72-80. In dicta, the Court stated that the enforcement of civil rights as
benefits of national citizenship was inappropriate and degrading to the states. Id. at 81-82. In addi-
tion to shattering the privileges and immunities clause that gave life to the Civil Rights Acts of 1870
and 1871, the Court in dicta denigrated the thirteenth amendment by calling it a "grand yet simple
declaration of the personal freedom of all the human race." Id. at 69. This characterization of the
thirteenth amendment as vague and ineffective made the fourteenth amendment essential to guaran-
tee freedom and civil rights to all citizens. See Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History
of the Thirteenth Amendment (Ch. III, Judicial Emasculation of the Thirteenth Amendment in the
Post-Civil War Decades), 12 Hous. L. REv. 357, 363-65 (1975). During debate on the Civil Rights
Act of 1875, the Slaughter-House decision significantly impacted Congress' perception of its author-
ity to enact civil rights legislation. Buchanan, supra note 50, at 344; see supra note 53.
Congress also played a role in weakening the force of the reconstruction efforts. In 1873 Con-
gress revised the federal statutes and separated the civil rights provisions into unrelated chapters.
Buchanan, supra, at 366-67. Following a disputed presidential election in 1876, "secret" negotia-
tions took place between Democrats and Republicans that resulted in the Compromise of 1877. Id.
To guarantee the Republican candidate Rutherford B. Hayes the presidency, the Republican Con-
gress agreed to end federal intervention in civil rights. Id. This compromise strongly influenced the
Supreme Court to interpret the existing statutes narrowly to avoid conflict with the Compromise.
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in 1883 in the Civil Rights Cases,57 five cases brought under the Civil Rights Act
of 1875 for the denial to blacks of the equal enjoyment of hotel, theater, and
railroad accommodations.58 The issue before the United States Supreme Court
was the constitutionality of the 1875 Act.5 9 The Court recognized that the en-
forcement clause of the thirteenth amendment gave Congress the "power to pass
all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery
in the United States." 6 The Civil Rights Cases Court defined the phrase
"badges and incidents of slavery" to include the "disability to hold property, to
make contracts .... to be a witness against a white person, and such like burdens
and incapacities." ' 61 The Court considered the converse of these disabilities to be
the fundamental rights that distinguish freedom from slavery. 62 Under the thir-
teenth amendment, Congress could enact laws to protect these fundamental
rights, but, in the Court's view, Congress could not regulate so-called "social
rights." 63 The Court concluded that application of the Civil Rights Act of 1875
in each of the five underlying cases amounted to an attempt to regulate such
social rights.64 Therefore, Congress exceeded its authority under the thirteenth
Id.; J. SCHMIDHAUSER, CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW IN AMERICAN POLITIcs 251-52 (1984); Buchanan,
supra, at 366-67; Sullivan, supra note 39, at 559 n.l 17.
57. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
58. Id. at 3-4. Four of the cases were criminal prosecutions of private individuals; the fifth was
a civil action against a railroad. Id.
59. The prosecution claimed that the statute was constitutional under both the thirteenth and
fourteenth amendments. Id. at 10. The Court quickly dismissed the claim of constitutionality under
the fourteenth amendment because that amendment reached only state action. Id. at 11. The Court
then looked to the thirteenth amendment, which did not have language limiting it to state action. Id.
at 20. The thirteenth "amendment is not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding
slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part
of the United States." Id.
60. Id. at 20. The Court clarified the issue before it:
Conceding the major proposition to be true, that Congress has a right to enact all necessary
and proper laws for the obliteration.and prevention of slavery with all its badges and inci-
dents, is the minor proposition also true, that the denial to any person of admission to the
accommodations and privileges of an inn, a public conveyance, or a theater, does subject
that person to any form of servitude, or tend to fasten upon him any badge of slavery?
Id. at 20-21.
61. Id. at 22.
62. Id.
63. Id. The Civil Rights Cases Court failed to consider the factual background of the thirteenth
amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The detailed legislative history evidences the goals of
Congress to end all oppression of blacks. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. These goals
show how far Congress intended its power under the thirteenth amendment to reach-because Con-
gress intended to reach private conduct, such as lynching, or the failure to pay contracted wages, the
amendment must have empowered them to do so. In defining "fundamental rights," the Civil Rights
Cases Court's social rights fundamental rights distinction did not consider the inequities Congress
sought to remedy. Rather, the Court looked at the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 for an
indication of the authority exercised by Congress under the thirteenth amendment and concluded
that "Congress did not assume... to adjust what may be called the social rights of men.., but only
to declare and vindicate those fundamental rights." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22.
64. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24. The Court had drawn the meaning of fundamental rights
of citizenship narrowly, so that Congress could create only the legal capacity to enjoy those funda-
mental rights. Buchanan, supra note 56, at 375. Although blacks had the legal capacity to contract
for public accommodations pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Court concluded that acts
of private discrimination interfered only with social rights, and, therefore, Congress could not regu-
late these private acts of discrimination under the powers conferred by the thirteenth amendment.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22-24. Violations of "social rights" were redressable only under state
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amendment, and the 1875 Act was unconstitutional as applied. 65
Supreme Court decisions from 1873 to 1906 significantly diminished the
laws. Id. In effect, the Court concluded that Congress did not have the power to regulate most types
of private racial discrimination. Id. at 21-22.
Justice Harlan was the lone dissenter in the Civil Rights Cases. He objected to the restrictions
placed on Congress' power to eliminate slavery under the thirteenth amendment. Id. at 26 (Harlan,
J., dissenting). Justice Harlan concluded that Congress had the power "to protect the freedom estab-
lished [by the thirteenth amendment], and consequently, to secure the enjoyment of such civil rights
as were fundamerftal in freedom." Id. at 35 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan then challenged the majority's conclusion that private racial discrimination in
public accommodations did not constitute a badge or incident of slavery. Id. at 37 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). He analyzed the history of slavery and reached the conclusion that slavery rested on the
treatment of blacks as an inferior race. Id. at 36 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Therefore, any means of
preserving this inferior status constituted a badge or incident of slavery. Id. at 39-40 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Harlan concluded that blacks could never be free from slavery until the practices
that branded them as inferior were eliminated. Id. at 36-37 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Justice
Harlan's view, the freedom guaranteed by the thirteenth amendment "necessarily involved immunity
from, and protection against, all discrimination against them, because of their race, in respect of such
civil rights as belong to freemen of other races." Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan argued that Congress would not have destroyed the institution of slavery and left
the substantive protections for freedmen up to the discretion of the states. Id. at 34 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). He recognized that the power to provide only legal capacities to former slaves was
useless because private individuals could nullify these capacities by permissible racial discrimination
and the denial of social rights. Buchanan, supra note 56, at 376. In Justice Harlan's view, Congress
could regulate the impact of slavery on "the broader range of social, political, and economic rela-
tions throughout America." Id. at 377. Justice Harlan concluded:
ihe substance and spirit of the recent amendments of the Constitution have been sacri-
ficed by a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism.... Constitutional provisions, adopted in
the interests of liberty, and for the purpose of securing, through national legislation, if need
be, rights inhering in a state of freedom, and belonging to American citizenship, have been
so construed as to defeat the ends the people desired to accomplish, which they attempted
to accomplish, and which they supposed they had accomplished by changes in their funda-
mental law .... [ihe Court has departed from the familiar rule requiring, in the interpreta-
tion of constitutional provisions, that full effect be given to the intent with which they were
adopted.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Harlan's view
would not prevail, however, until more than a half of a century later. See infra notes 65, 73, 92-95 &
199.
65. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24. The Court again considered the Civil Rights Act of 1875
in the landmark case of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Plessy challenged the constitution-
ality of a state statute that required separate-but-equal accommodations for white and black passen-
gers on trains on the grounds that it conflicted with the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. Id.
at 542. Based on this state law, railroad officials and law enforcement officers ordered Plessy to leave
a coach reserved for white passengers. Id. at 541-42. When Plessy refused, the officers forcibly
removed him from the coach and imprisoned him for violating the law. !d. at 542.
The Louisiana Supreme Court refused to grant Plessy's request for a writ of prohibition to
prevent the district court from sentencing him to imprisonment on charges of violating a separate-
but-equal accommodations law. Id. at 539-40. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the state
court's holding that the separate-but-equal accommodations law did not violate either the thirteenth
or the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 552. As to the thirteenth amendment, the Court relied on its
holding in the Civil Rights Cases and held that a legal distinction based on race "has no tendency to
destroy the legal equality of the two races, or reestablish a state of involuntary servitude." Id. at
543. The Court found that the fourteenth amendment only guaranteed political equality of blacks
and whites, not social equality. Id. at 544. The Court reasoned that separation of the two races did
not mark the black passengers with a "badge of inferiority." Id. at 551. The Court concluded: "If
the civil and political rights of both races be equal one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or
politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot
put them upon the same plane." Id. at 551-52. According to the Court, "[t]he argument ... as-
sumes that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured
to the negro except by an enforced comingling of the two races." Id. at 551. Refusing to accept this
argument, the Court concluded that Congress cannot regulate social equality, but rather, "it must be
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scope and effectiveness of Congress' nineteenth-century civil rights statutory
framework. Prior to the Civil Rights Cases, the Court had limited the reach of
the thirteenth amendment to proscribing only slavery, 66 rather than all racial
discrimination, and characterized the thirteenth amendment as vague and inef-
fective. 67 The Court further had determined that the fourteenth amendment did
not restrict private acts of racial discrimination and only protected rights of na-
tional citizenship. 68 Following the Civil Rights Cases, the Court further eviscer-
ated the federal civil rights laws by upholding state separate-but-equal laws 6 9
and narrowly interpreting the thirteenth amendment to prohibit only acts that
constitute the "'entire subrogation'" of blacks. 70 A common aspect of the
the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits and a voluntary consent
of individuals." Id.
Justice Harlan, in a dissent reminiscent of his dissent in the Civil Rights Cases, argued that the
thirteenth amendment prevents the imposition of all badges of slavery, including the "arbitrary sepa-
ration of citizens, on the basis of race, while they are on a public highway." Id. at 562 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Harlan's views finally took root in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), and in 1968 became the views of the Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409 (1968). See infra notes 73, 92-95 & 199.
66. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 641 (1882). The Harris Court concluded that the
thirteenth amendment did not authorize the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 because the amendment
"simply prohibit[ed] slavery and involuntary servitude." Id. The Court predicted that the Ku Klux
Klan Act could apply in situations involving only white citizens that would not implicate the badges
of slavery; therefore, the statute was too broad. Id. The Harris Court further held that the criminal
conspiracy section of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress'
power under the fourteenth amendment because it punished private action and that the fourteenth
amendment was limited to proscribing state action. Id. at 644.
67. Buchanan, supra note 56, at 363-65; see supra note 56.
68. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551-57 (1875). In Cruikshank the Supreme
Court expressly limited Congress' power under the fourteenth amendment in the area of civil rights
by allowing it to protect only the rights of national citizenship. Id. at 554-55. Such rights included
the right to assemble, id. at 551; the right to assert a claim against the government, transact business
with it, or seek protection from it; the right to free access to the seaports, treasuries, land offices, and
federal courts, and the right to federal protection abroad and on the high seas. The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79-80 (1873). The Cruikshank Court further concluded that the first
section of the fourteenth amendment only reached state action and could not reach private action.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 555; accord Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879).
69. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896); see supra note 65.
70. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906) (quoting Webster's Dictionary definition of
"slavery"). The Hodges Court stated that the thirteenth amendment only denounced slavery, which
the Court narrowly defined as "'the state of entire subjection of one person to the will of another.'"
Id. (quoting Webster's Dictionary definition of "slavery"). In Hodges the United States Supreme
Court had its first opportunity to construe the making and enforcing contracts clause of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. Id. at 22 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1977, the prior codifica-
tion of 42 U.S.C. § 1981). The prosecution obtained a conviction against the defendants in Hodges
in federal district court for conspiring to oppress, threaten, and intimidate a group of black laborers
to leave their jobs at a lumber mill. Id. at 3-4. Addressing the defendants' constitutional challenge
to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Court first indicated that federal jurisdiction over the indictment
depended on the reach of the thirteenth amendment. Id. at 14-15. The prosecution argued that
using intimidation and force to compel a black worker to stop performing a contract constituted an
act of enslavement within the meaning of the thirteenth amendment. Id. at 17. The Hodges Court
rejected this argument and stated that "no mere personal assault or trespass... operates to reduce
the individual to a condition of slavery." Id. at 18. The Court concluded that because Congress
gave citizenship to blacks, they, like all other citizens, must look to the state courts for redress of any
injury that does not constitute slavery. Id. at 19-20.
In dissent, Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Day, noted that even the Court in the Civil Rights
Cases recognized that the disability to make contracts for one's services was an inseparable incident
of slavery. Id. at 30-32 (Harlan, J. dissenting) (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20-23). Because
Congress had the power to define the badges and incidents of slavery, and the Court already had
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Supreme Court decisions in this period was strict, literal interpretation of the
language of the civil rights statutes without reference to the events from which
they originated. 7 1 The Court emphasized the concern for the integrity of state
sovereignty and denigrated the purposes of the civil rights legislation. 72 This
lack of support for civil rights led one commentator to conclude that the
Supreme Court was so influenced by federalism concerns "that it would necessi-
tate a judicial and constitutional upheaval of the first magnitude to undo what
the Court has done."'73
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, Congress renewed its efforts to
protect civil rights by enacting five major civil rights statutes in basically the
same areas as Congress had legislated nearly a century earlier.74 Of particular
determined that the disability to make a contract for services was an incident of slavery, Justice
Harlan concluded that the statute prohibited a conspiracy to prevent black citizens from making and
performing contracts solely on the basis of race. Id. at 38 (Harlan, J. dissenting). Justice Harlan
concluded that the conviction in the federal district court should stand. Id. (Harlan, J. dissenting).
In the years following Hodges, litigation under the thirteenth amendment generally was limited
to determining which acts constituted slavery or involuntary servitude within the meaning of the
thirteenth amendment. Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth
Amendment (Ch. IV, The Dormant Years of the Thirteenth Amendment), 12 Hous. L. REV. 593,
597 (1975).
71. See supra note 63.
72. See Hodges, 203 U.S. at 14-15, 19-20; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22-24; The Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81-82 (1873); supra notes 56, 64 & 70.
73. Gressman, supra note 55, at 1357. The commentator summarized his views on the period:
The civil rights program of the Reconstruction era has thus come down to a pitiful
handful of statutory provisions, most of which are burdened by the dead weight of strict
eonstructionism. The great fervor with which the elected representatives of the people
decided to nationalize civil rights has been "cooled by the breath of judicial construc-
tion." ...
The legislative program of the post-Civil War days was premised on the belief that the
fundamental rights of the individual should be defined and enforced by the federal govern-
ment. But the Supreme Court has consistently refused to accept that premise. It has sub-
stituted its belief that civil rights lie within the realm of state power and that any federal
attempt to encroach on that power is to be viewed narrowly and suspiciously. The Court
has expressed its belief so many times that it would necessitate a judicial and constitutional
upheaval of the first magnitude to undo what the Court has done.
Id. (footnote omitted).
The "upheaval of the first magnitude" found its genesis in the case of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown the United States Supreme Court overruled Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896), and its separate-but-equal doctrine by holding that racially segregated school
systems deny equal protection in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
Although the Civil Rights Cases have never been overruled expressly, the decision in Brown em-
braced the sentiments of Justice Harlan's dissent in the Civil Rights Cases and clearly undermined
the majority's holding that Congress could not regulate social rights. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494
(the separation of races denotes "inferiority" of the black race); supra note 64. The Brown decision
and its constitutional directive to desegregate the schools met with great resistance. See, e.g., Cooper
v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (Governor Faubus of Arkansas defied the order of the federal govern-
ment and put a high school "off limits" to black children.). Nevertheless, this decision paved the
way for blacks to exercise their civil rights and opened doors to economic and social opportunities.
74. Between 1957 and 1968 Congress enacted five major civil rights acts: Civil Rights Act of
1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971, 1975 to 1975e (1982)); Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. § 241 (1988); 20 U.S.C. § 640 (1988); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1974 to 1974e
(1982)); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447 (1982); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975a to 1975c (Supp. V 1987); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 to 2000h-6 (1982));
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1971 (1982); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)); Civil Rights Act of 1968,
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relevance to the Patterson case was the provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 196475 that prohibits "discriminat[ion] against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual's race."'76 Patterson's claims of racial harassment
during her employment clearly were redressable under this broad language in
Title VII.77 To recover under Title VII, the employee must first submit her
claims to an administrative agency conciliation process.78  Additionally, the
statutory remedies available under Title VII are significantly limited. In a case
such as Patterson, the employee would receive backpay lost during only the pre-
vious two years as a result of the employer's discrimination and also could ob-
tain equitable remedies, such as reinstatement or an injunction to prevent future
discrimination. 79 Remedies under section 1981 by comparison are far more gen-
erous. If a plaintiff prevails on a section 1981 claim, the common-law remedies
of compensatory and punitive damages are available.80 The legislative history of
Title VII indicates that Congress was aware that there would be overlap in the
coverage of Title VII and the nineteenth-century civil rights statutes, but it re-
fused to make the Title VII statutory remedies exclusive.8 1 Patterson's entitle-
ment to the federal common-law remedies is the central issue in the Patterson
case.82
Patterson's suit was brought under section 1981, which originated from the
Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-06, 3631 (1982)). For a
detailed discussion of these enactments, see Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of
the Thirteenth Amendment (Ch. V, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Modern Civil Rights Legisla-
tion), 12 Hous. L. REv. 610, 610-28 (1975).
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
76. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
77. See infra texts accompanying notes 159 & 164.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982). "Only after these procedures have been exhausted, and the
plaintiff has obtained a 'right to sue' letter from the EEOC, may she bring a Title VII action in
court." Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2375 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982)). By comparison,
§ 1981 claims do not require administrative review or conciliatory efforts. Id. Patterson tried un-
successfully to obtain relief through conciliation and had obtained a right to sue letter under Title
VII from the EEOC before bringing her suit under § 1981. Brief for Respondent at 7, Patterson (No.
87-107).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
80. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975); see also Patterson, 109 S.
Ct. at 2375 n.4 ("[A] plaintiff in a Title VII action is limited to a recovery of backpay, whereas under
§ 1981 a plaintiff may be entitled to plenary compensatory damages, as well as punitive damages in
an appropriate case.").
81. During debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Senator Tower proposed that Title VII
should be the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination. Brief for Petitioner on Reargument
at 76, Patterson (No. 87-107). Favoring this proposal, Senator Ervin read the text of § 1981 into the
congressional record. Id. Indicating its intent to retain the remedies available in the nineteenth-
century civil rights provisions, the Senate rejected the Tower proposal. Id. Congress has similarly
rejected subsequent attempts to amend Title VII to make it the exclusive remedy for employment
discrimination. See infra note 174.
82. Patterson chose to bring suit under § 1981 because of the greater monetary damages avail-
able. See Brief for Petitioner at 60-61, Patterson (No. 87-107) (noting that the only monetary remedy
available under Title VII is lost wages; therefore, racial harassment may not give rise to any mone-
tary claim for backpay under Title VII). Even though she had obtained a right to sue letter, she
decided to forgo her Title VII remedies. By the time Patterson filed her § 1981 suit, the 90-day
period to file a Title VII suit pursuant to the right to sue letter had expired. See Brief for Respon-
dent, supra note 78, at 7 (right to sue letter received on June 30, 1983; § 1981 suit filed on January
25, 1984).
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Civil Rights Act of 1866.83 Prior to Patterson the United States Supreme Court
had limited opportunities to interpret the meaning of section 1981.84 Because
section 1982 also originated from the Civil Rights Act of 1866,85 cases interpret-
ing this companion statute provide a meaningful base for determining the scope
of section 1981.
During the atmosphere of civil rights reform in the 1960s, the Supreme
Court reversed the eighty-five-year trend of restrictive judicial construction of
civil rights statutes. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 86 the Court concluded that
the enabling clause of the thirteenth amendment8 7 empowered Congress to enact
laws that prohibited private acts of racial discrimination.8 8 Therefore, section
1982, which granted all citizens the same right "to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property,"8 9 prohibited a private company
from refusing to sell a house to a black family.90
To determine the intended scope of section 1982, the Jones Court looked to
the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.91 The Court noted that
the statute's authors had stated the broad objective of the statute as " 'secur[ing]
to all persons within the United States practical freedom.'"92 Further, the
83. See supra note 2; text accompanying notes 46-47.
84. Before Patterson the Court had never addressed the meaning of the "making and enforcing
contracts" language had never been addressed expressly by the Court before Patterson. In Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the Court recognized in dictum, however, that the lack of
power "to make or perform contracts" was an incident of slavery. Id. at 441 n.78; see infra note 96
and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 2; text accompanying notes 46-47.
86. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Plaintiff Jones alleged that the Mayer Company violated § 1982 by
refusing to sell his family a home solely because he was black. Id. at 412. The court of appeals
affirmed the dismissal of the case on the ground that § 1982 only applied to state action and did not
reach private racial discrimination. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d 33, 45 (8th Cir. 1967),
rev'd, 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
87. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2. For text of the amendment and enabling clause, see supra
note 39.
88. Jones, 392 U.S. at 413. The enabling clause empowered Congress "'to pass all laws neces-
sary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.'" Jones, 392
U.S. at 439 (quoting and emphasizing language from The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)),
The Jones Court extended the "badges and incidents of slavery" concept to include the actions of
violence and discrimination that the Reconstruction Congress had sought to eradicate. Id. at 440-
44. The Jones Court stated:
Surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine
what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that deter-
mination into effective legislation .... [W]hatever else they may have encompassed, the
badges and incidents of slavery-its "burdens and disabilities"--included restraints upon
"those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right...
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens."
Id. at 440-41 (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22) (emphasis added).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982).
90. Jones, 392 U.S. at 425-26. The Supreme Court's initial reaction was that private individuals
could impair the rights guaranteed in § 1982 equally as well as the state. Id. at 420-21. The Court
reasoned that if a black person can be turned down for buying a house simply because he is not
white, that black person does not enjoy "the same right" to purchase real property as a white citizen.
Id. at 421.
91. Id. at 422-37.
92. Id. at 431 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866)). The Court noted that
Senator Trumbull, the bill's originator, had indicated that the bill would" 'destroy all [the] discrimi-
nations'" embodied in the Black Codes, as well as secure to all men the "'great fundamental
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Court indicated that the legislators were well aware that private individuals and
unofficial groups were oppressing and mistreating blacks.93 The Jones Court
concluded from the legislative history that the 1866 Act was intended to have a
sweeping effect 94 and that its substantive provisions were "meant to prohibit all
racially motivated deprivations of the rights enumerated in the statute."' 95 The
Jones Court further noted in dictum that a majority of the Court already had
"recognized that 'one of the disabilities of slavery, one of the indicia of its exist-
ence was a lack of power to make orperform contracts.' "96
The Jones Court's broad interpretation of the "badges and incidents of slav-
ery" language opened the door for future use of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and
reversed the trend of prior Courts in limiting the reach of the thirteenth amend-
ment to only actual enslavement. 97 The Jones Court had qualified its holding by
stating that section 1982 "is not a comprehensive open housing law"98 and that
"[iut does not deal specifically with discrimination in the provision of services or
facilities in connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling." 99 Nevertheless,
subsequent Courts consistently interpreted the statute's provisions broadly to
reach varied acts of private racial discrimination.l10 Determining that the term
"lease" in section 1982 included the ability to assign a membership share in
recreational facilities free from racially motivated interference, the Court in Sul-
rights.'" Id. at 432 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866)). These fundamental
rights included "'the right to acquire property, the right to go and come at pleasure, the right to
enforce the rights in the courts, to make contracts, and to inherit and dispose of property.'" Id.
(quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866)).
93. Jones, 392 U.S. at 427-29. The Schurz Report made Congress aware of the violent and
oppressive acts. See supra note 41.
94. Jones, 392 U.s. at 433.
95. Id. at 426. Concerned over the possible conflict that the new decision created, the Jones
Court overruled Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906) (case involving prior codification of
§ 1981), to the extent that it was inconsistent with Jones. Jones, 392 U.S. at 442 n.78. For a discus-
sion of the Hodges case, see supra note 70.
96. Jones, 392 U.S. at 441 n.78 (quoting Hodges, 203 U.S. at 17) (emphasis added). The major-
ity in Hodges only acknowledged this statement as an argument. Hodges, 203 U.S. at 17; see supra
note 70. In his Hodges dissent, however, Justice Harlan concluded that interference in the making or
performing of contracts would consititute a violation of the rights provided in the earlier codification
of § 1981. Hodges, 203 U.S. at 32 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see supra note 70.
97. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
98. Jones, 392 U.S. at 413.
99. Id. (emphasis added). The Court in Jones further qualified its statements:
In noting that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 differs from the Civil Rights Act of 1968 in not deal-
ing explicitly and exhaustively with such matters[,] ...we intimate no view upon the
question whether ancillary services or facilities . . . might in some situations constitute
"property" as that term is employed in § 1982. Nor do we intimate any view upon the
extent to which discrimination in the provision of such services might be barred by 42
U.S.C. § 1981 ....
Id. at 413 n.10.
100. The Court has not limited interpretations to the express language in § 1982 in an effort not
to bar recovery to plaintiffs who were the victims of racially discriminatory conduct. See, e.g., Shaare
Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617-18 (1987) (protections of § 1982 extend to Jews
because they were a separate race at the time § 1982 was adopted); Saint Francis College v. Al-
Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (protections of § 1981 extend to Arabs because they were a
separate race at the time § 1981 was adopted); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n, 410
U.S. 431, 437 (1973) (§ 1982 prohibits excluding black residents from membership in community
recreational facilities); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236-37 (1969) (same);
infra notes 101 & 104.
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livan v. Little Hunting Park Inc. 10 1 stated that "[a] narrow construction of the
language of § 1982 would be quite inconsistent with the broad and sweeping
nature of the protection meant to be afforded by ... the Civil Rights Act of
1866."102 More recently, the Supreme Court in City of Memphis v. Greene 103
stated that "[t]o effectuate the remedial purposes of the statute, the Court has
broadly construed this language [in section 1982] to protect not merely the en-
forceability of property interests acquired by black citizens but also their right to
acquire and use property on an equal basis with white citizens." 1°4
The Supreme Court's most significant decision on section 1981 was Runyon
101. 396 U.S. 229, 236-37 (1969). In Sullivan a recreational club denied a black man, who
rented a house in a residential area, the right to use community facilities because of his race. Id. at
236. The Court reasoned that because the black man paid part of his rent for use of the facilities, use
of the facilities was clearly within the "lease." Id. at 237. The Court held that the facility's refusal
to approve the membership assignment on account of race was an interference with the right to
"lease" guaranteed by § 1982. Id. at 236-37. The Court stated that § 1982 protects "against interfer-
ence by third parties, as well as against the actions of the immediate lessor." Id. at 237.
Several years later the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Sullivan decision in Tillman v. Wheaton-
Haven Recreational Association, 410 U.S. 431 (1973). In Tillman owners of houses in a limited
geographic area had the opportunity to obtain a membership in the facility. Id. at 433. Residents of
the community did not need a recommendation to apply for membership, were placed at the top of
the waiting list, and could sell their membership to the purchaser of their property if they moved. Id.
A black man who had purchased a house from a nonmember within the defined area, inquired about
membership in the facilities and the Association discouraged him from applying because of his race.
Id. at 433-34. Later that year a white couple, who were members of the club, brought a black guest
to the pool. Id. at 434. The black woman was admitted that day, but the board of directors quickly
changed the guest policy to include only relatives of members. Id. Under this new policy, the same
black woman subsequently was refused admission to the pool as a guest. Id.
Plaintiffs in Tillman brought suit against the Association under § 1981 and § 1982 for denying
membership benefits in a recreational facility to them on account of race. Id. The Court concluded
that because the organization had linked its membership benefits to home ownership in a defined
geographic area, the organization "infuse[d] those benefits into the bundle of rights for which an
individual pays when buying or leasing within the area." Id. (emphasis added). The Tillman Court
looked at the economic consequences to the black resident because he would be unable to assure a
future purchaser of his property a membership option in the club. Id. at 437. The Court also attrib-
uted part of the price paid for the house to the automatic waiting list preference. Id. The Court
therefore concluded that § 1982 guaranteed to the black resident the same right to enjoy member-
ship in the facilities. Id.
The Court remanded the § 1981 and § 1982 claims of the white couple and black guest-that
the Association could not adopt a racially discriminatory guest policy-after concluding that the
Association was not exempt from § 1981. Id. at 440 ("[ifn light of the historical interrelationship
between § 1981 and § 1982, we see no reason to construe these sections differently").
102. Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237.
103. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
104. Id. at 120 (emphasis added). In Greene the Supreme Court considered whether the closing
of a street, which forced black residents in a particular area of the city to drive several miles out of
their way, constituted a "badge or incident of slavery." Id. at 120. The Court concluded that the
street closing was not a violation of § 1982. Id. at 123. The respondents failed to prove that the
closing was a "municipal action benefiting white property owners that would be refused to similarly
situated black property owners." Id. Nor did the action depreciate the value of property owned by
blacks or severely restrict their access to their homes such that the "blacks would then be hampered
in the use of their property." Id. '
The Court also recently extended the protections of § 1982 to members of a Jewish synagogue
in Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617-18 (1987). The congregation accused
defendants of spray-painting the walls of the synagogue with anti-Semitic slogans, phrases, and sym-
bols in violation of § 1982. Id. at 616. Responding to the defendants' assertion that Jews are not a
racially distinct group protected by the statute, the Court held that Jews and Arabs were among the
peoples considered "at the time § 1982 was adopted" to be distinct races. Id. at 617-18. Thus, Jews
and Arabs were within the statute's protections. Id. (citing Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji,
481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987)). In Saint Francis a professor brought suit against the university at which
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v. McCrary,105 in which the Court held that section 1981 prohibited racial dis-
crimination in the making and enforcing of private, as well as public, con-
tracts.106 The issue before the Court in Runyon was "whether § 1981 prohibits
private, commercially operated, nonsectarian schools from denying admission to
prospective students because they are Negroes, and if so, whether that federal
law is constitutional as so applied." 10 7
Relying on Jones and later cases broadening application of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, the Court in Runyon stated: "It is now well established that [section
1981] ... prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of pri-
vate contracts."10 8 Noting that both section 1981 involved in Runyon and sec-
tion 1982 involved in Jones originated from section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 109 the Runyon Court intimated that section 198 l's reach was equivalent to
section 1982's reach. 110 The Court reaffirmed its decision in Jones that Congress
he taught for allegedly denying him tenure because of his Arab origin and Muslim religion. Saint
Francis, 481 U.S. at 613. The Court held that his claim was cognizable under § 1981. Id.
105. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). Although the opinion of the Runyon Court was supported by sevenjustices, the statements of Justices Powell and Stevens in their concurring opinions significantly
weakened the impact of the decision. See infra notes 110 and 112-14 and accompanying texts for a
discussion of the concurring opinions.
106. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 173.
107. Id. at 168. Plaintiffs in Runyon were parents of black children who had been denied admis-
sion to nonintegrated private schools because of their race. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 163-64. The par-
ents brought suit against the schools, alleging that the admissions policies violated their § 1981
rights to make and enforce contracts in the same manner as white citizens. Id. at 164. For the text
of § 1981, see supra note 25.
108. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168 (relying on Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 n.78(1968)). The Runyon Court also cited Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975),
and Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973), in support of the proposi-
tion that § 1981 prohibits acts of private racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of
contracts. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168. The Johnson Court had stated: "Although this Court has not
specifically so held, it is well settled among the FederalCourts of Appeal-and we now join them-
that § 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of
race." Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459-60. In Tillman the Court concluded that the recreational associa-
tion was not exempt from § 1981 and remanded the claim to the lower court. Tillman, 410 U.S. at
439-40; see supra note 101.
109. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 170. For the relevant text of § 1 of the 1866 Act, see supra text
accompanying note 46.
110. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 170-73; accord Jones, 392 U.S. at 441 n.78. The Runyon Court ex-
pressly rejected the defendant's argument that the two statutes have different statutory origins be-
cause Congress reenacted § 1981 after adopting the fourteenth amendment. Runyon, 427 U.S. at
168 n.8. The defendant argued unsuccessfully that Congress intentionally had reenacted § 1981
under the power of the fourteenth amendment to limit the statutes reach to state action. Id. Justice
White's dissent embraces the defendant's argument. See infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
Concurring separately, Justice Powell deferred to the precedent of recent cases, particularly
Jones, and concluded that § 1981 has the same purpose and meaning as § 1982 in light of their
common derivation. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 186-87 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell began his
concurring opinion with this statement:
If the slate were clean I might be inclined to agree with Mr. Justice White that § 1981
was not intended to restrict private contractual choices. Much of the review of history and
purpose of this statute set forth in his dissenting opinion is quite persuasive. It seems to me,
however, that it comes too late.
Id. at 186 (Powell, J., concurring).
In an effort to limit the holding, Justice Powell distinguished private contractual relationships
from commercial contractual relationships offered to the general public. Id. at 186 (Powell, J., con-
curring). In Justice Powell's view, it would be possible for a contractual relationship to be "so
personal" that it did not come within the reach of § 1981. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
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has the power under the thirteenth amendment to enact laws to eliminate pri-
vate racial discrimination and found that section 1981 prohibited private schools
from denying admission to black children on the basis of race.111
Although Justice Stevens believed that Jones was wrongly decided, he
joined the Runyon majority because the decision in Jones had become "an im-
portant part of the fabric of our law." 112 Interested in a stable and orderly
development of the law, Justice Stevens favored adherence to a precedent that
"surely accords with the prevailing sense of justice today."' "13 Justice Stevens
believed that the Court in recent years had given a sympathetic and liberal con-
struction to civil rights legislation in support of Congress' policy to move "con-
stantly in the direction of eliminating racial segregation in all sectors of
society."14
In dissent, Justice White argued that the precedent of the Civil Rights
Cases 1 5 should control Runyon because that interpretation was written "almost
contemporaneously" with the statute. 1 6 Justice White viewed the right "to
make contracts" to include only the right to contract with willing parties." 17
Justice White argued that section 1981's authors did not intend the statute to
compel unwilling parties to contract." 8 Although Justice White did not ex-
pressly use the "social rights" and "fundamental rights" dichotomy of the Civil
Rights Cases, 1 9 he attempted in effect to revive the Court's nineteenth-century
view that Congress cannot regulate equality, but rather equality "must be the
result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits and a
voluntary consent of individuals."' 120 Court decisions in the twentieth century
clearly have overruled this view. 12 1
Focusing on the legislative history of section 1981, Justice White's primary
111. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 179.
112. Id. at 190. Justice Stevens, concurring separately, indicated that he would vote to reverse
Jones and its progeny if he were writing on a "clean slate." Id. at 190 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens stated that he "firmly believe[d] [Jones] to have been incorrectly decided." Id. at 189
(Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens argued that the legislative intent of § 1 of the 1866 Act was
only to guarantee equal legal capacity to all citizens with regard to the rights enumerated in the
statute. d. (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens thought the present interpretation would shock
the Reconstruction Congress. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 190-91 (Stevens, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 191 (Stevens, J., concurring).
115. 109 U.S. 3 (1883); see supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
116. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 192 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White stated:
We are urged here to extend the meaning and reach of [§ 1981] so as to establish a
general prohibition against a private individual's or institution's refusing to enter into a
contract with another person because of that person's race. Section 1981 has been on the
books since 1870 and to so hold for the first time would be contrary to the language of the
section, to its legislative history, and to the clear dictum of this Court in the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 16-17 (1883), almost contemporaneously with the passage of the statute,
that the section reaches only discriminations imposed by state law.
Id. (White, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
117. Id. at 193-94 (White, J., dissenting).
118. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
119. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
120. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
121. See supra note 73.
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argument was that sections 1981 and 1982 do not have the same origin because
Congress altered the scope and meaning of section 1981 when it reenacted the
section after the passage of the fourteenth amendment. 122 That alteration
changed the class of persons protected by section 1981's predecessor statute
from "all persons born in the United States" to "all persons within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States." 12 3 Justice White argued that this change was to
bring the statute into agreement with the language in the fourteenth amend-
ment,124 which provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws." 125 In Justice White's view, this reenact-
ment limited section 1981's proscriptions to state action. 126 Therefore, section
1981 only "outlaws any legal rule disabling any person from making or enforc-
ing a contract, but does not prohibit private racially motivated refusals to con-
tract." 127 The Runyon majority expressly rejected Justice White's reenactment
argument.128
Several years after Runyon, the Supreme Court turned again to the legisla-
tive history of section 1981 in General Building Contractors Association v. Penn-
sylvania129 to determine whether the section reaches practices that result in a
disparate impact on a particular race or whether it is limited to purposeful dis-
crimination.130 The Court noted that the principal goal of the legislation was to
eradicate the Black Codes that were considered by Congress to be "consciously
conceived methods of resurrecting the incidents of slavery."' 131 The Court did
not embrace a broad reading of section 1981 and noted that Congress had de-
leted broad opening language from section 1 of the 1866 Act to limit the statute
to the specific rights named therein.' 32 The Court concluded that Congress ac-
ted only to protect against "intentional discrimination by those whose object was
'to make their former slaves dependent serfs, victims of unjust laws, and debar-
red from all progress and elevation by organized social prejudices.' 133 The
122. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 195-201 & nn.6-9 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Voting Rights Act of
May 31, 1870, ch. 64, § 16, 16 Stat. 144, as the sole source of § 1981).
123. Compare the current text of § 1981, supra note 25, with the original text of § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, supra text accompanying note 46.
124. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 202-04 (White, J., dissenting).
125. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
126. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 192 (White, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 195 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 168 n.8. This controversy was the basis for the Court's decision in Patterson to
reconsider Runyon. See supra notes 5 & 7; infra notes 155 & 174.
129. 458 U.S. 375 (1982).
130. Id. at 386. The Court stated that it "must be mindful of the 'events and passions of the
time' in which the law was forged." Id. (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 803 (1966)).
131. Id. at 386-87. The Court quoted Senator Trumbull: "'This bill has nothing to do with the
political rights or status of parties. It is confined exclusively to their civil rights, such rights as should
appertain to every free man.'" Id. at 387 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1866)).
132. Id. at 388 n.15. The Court relied on this deletion as support for the view that Congress only
intended to reach intentional discrimination. Id.; see also Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791-92
(1966) (Court looked to this deletion and concluded that the statute was "intended to protect a
limited category of rights, specifically defined in terms of racial equality.").
133. General Bldg. Contractors, 458 U.S. at 388 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1839 (1866)).
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General Building Contractors decision imposes a logical limitation on section 1
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.134 The Court did not limit its interpretation of
the Act to the literal meaning of the statute's enumerated rights, but looked to
the legislative history to understand the intended scope of the Act.
Various lower federal courts have been willing to extend tile proscriptions
of section 198 l's "to make and enforce contracts" language to racial harassment
in the workplace. 135 One of the earliest decisions came from the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Carter v. Duncan-Hug-
gins, Ltd. 136 In Carter a black female employee at a small company alleged that
her employer had violated section 1981 by racially discriminating against her
throughout her employment.1 37 The jury awarded the employee $10,000 in
compensatory damages.138 The District of Columbia Circuit upheld the jury
award, stating that "the jury could have concluded that Carter, the company's
only black employee, consistently suffered conduct and conditions that were
worse than those imposed upon her fellow white employees. '139
The Courts of Appeals for the Second, 14° Fifth,141 Sixth,' 42 and Seventh
Circuits, 143 as well as several district courts, 144 all have reached the same con-
134. One year before it decided General Building Contractors, the Court in City of Memphis v.
Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981), intimated that a broad interpretation of § 1982 was necessary to effec-
tuate the remedial purposes of the statute, id. at 120, yet it refused to find that a street closing
constituted a badge or incident of slavery in violation of § 1982. Id. at 123; see supra note 104 and
accompanying text.
135. See, eg., Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1189-90 (2d Cir. 1987); Nazaire v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 807 F.2d 1372, 1380 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1039 (1987);
Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1421-22 (7th Cir. 1986); Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791
F.2d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 1986); Ramsey v. American Air Filter Co., 772 F.2d 1303, 1312-13 (7th Cir.
1985); Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Prods. Corp., 772 F.2d 1250, 1253-54 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1015 (1986); Carter v. Duncan-Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225, 1231-33 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 672 F. Supp. 1408, 1413 (M.D. Fla. 1987), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 863 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir. 1989); Nieto v. United Auto Workers Local 598, 672 F. Supp.
987, 990 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
136. 727 F.2d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
137. Id. at 1227. Duncan-Huggins did not fall within the coverage of Title VII because it had
fewer than fifteen employees. Id. at 1228.
138. Id. at 1231. The jury had based its award on evidence that Carter had "suffered unequal
treatment in her day-to-day existence at Dunean-Huggins." Id. at 1230.
139. Id. at 1233. In dissent, Justice Scalia, then a Circuit Judge, argued that the employer's
discrimination was not racially motivated. Id. at 1239 (Scalia, J., dissenting). At that time Justice
Scalia was willing to recognize a claim under § 1981 if the plaintiff established two elements: "(I)
that she had been discrirrinated against-that is, treated differently from others who were, for the
relevant purposes, similarly situated; and (2) that the reason for that discrimination was her race."
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. See, e.g., Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1189-90 (2d Cir. 1987).
141. See, eg., Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 1986).
142. See, e.g., Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Prods. Corp., 772 F.2d 1250, 1253-54 (6th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986). In Erebia the Sixth Circuit upheld a verdict for the plaintiff-
employee under § 1981 for racial harassment by fellow employees. Id. at 1256-57. In Nieto v.
United Auto Workers Local 598, 672 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Mich. 1987), the district court firmly
rejected the express decision of the Fourth Circuit in Patterson because it conflicted with the implicit
decision in Erebia, even though the Sixth Circuit had not concluded expressly that racial harassment
was cognizable under § 1981. Nieto, 672 F. Supp. at 990 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
805 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989); Erebia, 772 F.2d
at .1256-57).
143. See, e.g., Nazaire v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 807 F.2d 1372, 1380 (7th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1039 (1987); Ramsey v. American Air Filter Co., 772 F.2d 1303, 1312-13 (7th Cir.
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clusion as the District of Columbia Circuit. These courts generally require that
the racial harassment occur on more than one isolated occasion, such that it may
reasonably be termed "pervasive." 145
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. 146
treated the claim for racial harassment much like a tort claim. The Court indi-
cated that an employer would be directly liable for a tort committed by one
employee against another if the employer "could have prevented by reasonable
care in hiring, supervising, or if necessary firing the tortfeasor." 147 The Hunter
court indicated that tort liability in this instance was not premised on the doc-
trine of respondeat superior and the employee's conduct need not be in further-
ance of the employer's business. 148 Concluding that an employer has a
common-law duty to provide a work environment free of racial discrimination,
the court stated: "[A]n employer who has reason to know that one of his em-
ployees is being harassed in the workplace by others on grounds of race, sex,
religion, or national origin, and does nothing about it, is blameworthy." 149
Although these lower federal courts did not base their conclusion that ra-
cial harassment is cognizable under section 1981 on the legislative history of the
statute, 150 the precedent was one that many federal judges were willing to em-
1985). In Nazaire the court of appeals stated without further analysis: "It is well-settled that racial
harassment may be the basis of an independent claim of a violation of both Title VII and section
1981." Id. at 1380. In Ramsey the Seventh Circuit approved a jury instruction that, to support a
violation of§ 1981, "plaintiff had to prove that defendant subjected him to different terms and condi-
tions of employment from those that applied to white employees" solely because he was black. Ram-
sey, 772 F.2d at 1312. The court held that these instructions embodied the essence of a prima facie
case of discrimination under § 1981. Id. The plaintiff in Ramsey brought suit only under § 1981,
and not Title VII. Id. at 1305.
144. See, e.g., Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 672 F. Supp. 1408, 1413 (M.D. Fla. 1987),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 863 F.2d 1503 (1 1th Cir. 1989); Nieto v. United Auto Workers Local 598,
672 F. Supp. 987, 990 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
145. See, eg., Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184 (2d Cir. 1987). In Lopez the Second
Circuit concluded that a cause of action for a "hostile working environment" is redressable under
§ 1981 if "the incidents of harassment occur either in conceit or with a regularity that can reason-
ably be termed pervasive." Id. at 1189; accord Nazaire, 807 F.2d at 1380-81; Vance, 672 F. Supp. at
1413; Nieto, 672 F. Supp. at 990-91.
This requirement is consistent with the holdings on harassment claims brought under Title VII.
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (sexual harassment claim), the United States
Supreme Court defined a "hostile environment" harassment claim as one in which "'such conduct
has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creat-
ing an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.'" Id. at 65 (quoting EEOC Guide-
lines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1985)). The Meritor Court explained'that the employee was
protected from both economic and intangible discrimination by the "expansive concept" of the
phrase "terms, conditions or privileges of employment" in Title VII. Id. at 66. The Court held that
actionable harassment must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the vic-
tim's] employment and [to] create an abusive working environment.'" Id. at 67 (citing Rogers v.
EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (racial harassment claim), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972)).
146. 797 F.2d 1417 (7th Cir. 1986).
147. Id. at 1422.
148. Id.
149. Id. The Hunter court further required that the slurs be "so egregious, numerous, and con-
centrated as to add up to a campaign of harassment [before] the employer will be culpable." Id.; see
supra note 145 and accompanying text.
150. By 1987, an independent claim for racial harassment was so-well-settled that the district
court in Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 672 F. Supp. 1408 (M.D. Fla. 1987), aff'd in part,
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brace.' 51 Broad constuction of section 1981 to include a claim for racial harass-
ment during the performance of an employment contract accords with the
Supreme Court's broad construction of section 1982, its sister statute.15 2 In ad-
dition, broad application of section 1981's protections to the performance of
contract obligations furthers society's goal to end private racial discrimina-
tion. 153 The Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union to
define narrowly the rights protected by section 1981 appears out of step with its
own precedent and the majority of lower federal courts, as well as current socie-
tal values. 154
The Patterson Court began its analysis by reaffirming the Runyon decision
that section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in private, as well as public,
contracts. 155 The Court then turned to consider whether Patterson's claim of
racial harassment stated a cause of action under section 1981. According to the
Court, relief is available under this section only when racial discrimination im-
rev'd in part, 863 F.2d 1503 (1lth Cir. 1989), addressed the issue rather matter-of-factly: "Plaintiff
had to show that the alleged [racial] harassment denied her the same right to make and enforce her
contract of employment as was enjoyed by white citizens." Id. at 1413. The Vance court concluded
that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the discrimination was severe or pervasive, id., but never
intimated that § 1981's protections only applied to the infringement of either the right "to make" or
the right "to enforce" contracts.
151. But see Williams v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 627 F. Supp. 752, 757 n.5 (W.D.
Mo. 1986) (separate claim for racial harassment cannot be brought under § 1981); Minority Police
Officers Ass'n v. City of South Bend, 617 F. Supp. 1330, 1352 n.52 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (court found no
cases that permitted a separate claim for racial harassment under § 1981); United States v. City of
Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 631 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (claim for "intangible" injuries brought under Title
VII and not under § 1981).
152. See supra notis 100-04 and accompanying text. In Runyon v. MeCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168
n.8 (1976), a majority of the Court rejected the argument that the two statutes have different origins.
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
153. This conclusion is consistent with the views reflected in Justice Stevens' concurring opinion
in Runyon, see supra text accompanying notes 112-14, as well as the Patterson Court's premise for
not overruling Runyon, see infra note 155.
154. The decision in Patterson came as quite a surprise to employees and courts alike and re-
sulted in the immediate remand or dismissal of § 1981 racial harassment cases in federal courts
across the country. See, eg., McGinnis v. Ingram Equip. Co., 888 F.2d 109, 111 (11th Cir. 1989)
(per curiam) (lower court awarded plaintiff damages for racial harassment, discriminatory work
conditions, and failure to promote under § 1981; appeals court vacated and remanded in light of
Patterson); Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 1989) (relying on Patter-
son, court affirmed dismissal of plaintiff's § 1981 claim for interference with prospective business
opportunities because it did not fall within statute's protections); Williams v. Giant Eagle Markets,
Inc., 883 F.2d 1184, 1191 (3d Cir. 1989) (refused to consider plaintiff's § 1981 claim because of "the
difficult task of ascertaining whether any aspects of her claim fall within Patterson's narrow class of
actionable conduct under § 1981"); Risinger v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation, 883 F.2d
475, 479 (6th Cir. 1989) (dismissing § 1981 racial harassment claim in light of Patterson); Lynch v.
Belden & Co., 882 F.2d 262, 266-67 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirmed dismissal of racial harassment claim
without considering merits of appeal because Patterson precluded claim); Brooms v. Regal Tube Co.,
881 F.2d 412, 424 (7th Cir. 1989) (same).
155. Justice Kennedy first addressed the reconsideration of Runyon. Originally, the United
States Supreme Court granted Patterson's petition for writ of certiorari to decide the racial harass-
ment and jury instruction issues. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 484 U.S. 814 (1987) (granting
certiorari). After oral argument on these issues, the Supreme Court requested the parties to brief
and argue whether the Court should overturn the decision in Runyon, which applied § 1981 to
private contracts. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988) (order calling for
reargument); see supra note 5.
Justice Kennedy noted that several members of the Court questioned the Runyon decision in
1976 and that some members continued to question it. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2370. Justice Ken-
nedy, however, specified that the correctness of the Runyon decision was not the issue currently
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pairs one of the section's enumerated rights.15 6 The Court narrowly interpreted
the right "to make contracts" to extend "only to the formation of a contract, but
not to problems that may arise later from the conditions of continuing employ-
ment." 157 The Court believed that this right does not logically or literally in-
clude postformation conduct, including a breach of contract terms or the
imposition of discriminatory working conditions.1 58 According to the Court,
these "matters [are] more naturally governed by state contract law and Title
VII."159
The Court interpreted the right "to enforce contracts" to guarantee "a right
of access to legal process, that will address and resolve contract-law claims with-
out regard to race." 1 60 Applied to private parties, this protection prohibits pri-
vate efforts to interfere with access to the courts or to hinder alternative methods
before the Court. Id. Rather, the Court had to decide whether it should continue to adhere to the
reasoning in Runyon or overrule the decision. Id.
In deciding whether to overrule the case, the Court turned to the fundamental doctrine of stare
decisis to consider whether there was any special justification for overruling Runyon. Id. Generally,
the primary justification to overrule a case precedent is that there has been a contrary intervening
development of the law, either by judicial or legislative action. Id. at 2370-71. The Court may
overrule an earlier decision when judicial or legislative changes have weakened the basis of the ear-
lier decision, or "later law has rendered the decision irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or
policies." Id. The Court concluded that no actions subsequent to Runyon had undermined the deci-
sion. Id. at 2371.
A second traditional justification for overruling an earlier case is that the decision frustrates
consistency in the law because it is inherently confusing or unworkable, or because it interferes with
the realization of other legal objectives. Id. McLean argued that applying § 1981 to employment
contracts frustrates Title VII because the differences in the remedial schemes encourage employees
to avoid Title VII's administrative procedures by bringing suit initially under § 1981. Id. The Court
concluded, however, that "a sound construction of the language of § 1981 yields an interpretation
which does not frustrate the congressional objectives in Title VII to any significant degree." Id.
A final justification for overruling an earlier case is that the decision has become outdated and
inconsistent with society's sense of justice or social welfare. Id. The Court found Runyon to be
"entirely consistent with our society's deep commitment to the eradication of discrimination based
on a person's race or the color of his or her skin." Id. The Court pointed to a previous statement of
the Court that "'every pronouncement of this Court and myriad Acts of Congress and Executive
Orders attest a firm national policy to prohibit racial segregation and discrimination.'" Id. at 2371
(quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593 (1983)). The Patterson Court con-
cluded that Runyon remains the governing law in this area, and, therefore, the Court would not
overrule the decision to apply § 1981 to private contracts. Id. at 2371-72.
156. Id. at 2372. For the full text of § 1981, see supra note 25.
157. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2372. Section 1981 prohibits a racially based refusal to enter into a
contract with a black, as well as an offer to enter into a contract that contains discriminatory terms.
Id.
158. Id. at 2373.
159. Id. For the relevant text of Title VII, see supra note 24.
160. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373. The Court did not interpret the enforcement right to include
the right to have the employer perform the contract in a nondiscriminatory manner. The only pro-
tection this language guarantees is the opportunity to assert a claim based on some other law without
racially motivated interference by the employer or the courts. The anomaly of this limitation is that
there would have been no state or federal law that a black laborer could raise in 1866, because Title
VII and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are more recent sources of relief for em-
ployment discrimination. Even today the majority of state courts do not recognize a cause of action
for breach of an employment-at-will contract. See, e.g., Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 79
N.C. App. 483, 497, 340 S.E.2d 116, 125 (1986) ("North Carolina adheres to the common law
doctrine that employment contracts of indefinite duration are terminable at will" with or without
cause.) In Hogan the court held that one of the several plaintiffs' claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress for sexual harassment on the job was sufficient to go to the jury. Id. at 490-93.
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of resolving contract disputes. 16 1
The Court applied these principles in Patterson and determined that Patter-
son's claim sought redress for a racially discriminatory work environment-a
claim clearly attacking the conditions of her employment.162 The provisions of
section 1981, however, do not cover the conditions of employment expressly. 163
The Court noted that Title VII prohibits discrimination by an employer in the
"'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.' "64 The Court recognized
that section 1981 and Title VII necessarily overlap. 165 The Court believed that a
co-extensive interpretation of section 1981 "would also undermine the detailed
and well-crafted procedures for conciliation and resolution of Title VII
claims."1 66
The court of appeals in Patterson had not doubted that denying a promo-
tion based on race was actionable under section 1981.167 The Supreme Court,
however, qualified the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that a promotion claim was
cognizable under section 1981. The Court explained that to be actionable under
161. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373 (citing Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987)
(labor union violated § 1981 by intentionally refusing to process members' grievances about racial
discriminiation)).
162. Id. at 2374. Patterson's requested jury instructions indicated that she viewed her claim as
redressing a "work environment not free from racial prejudice," rather than racial discrimination by
McLean in the making of her employment contract. Id. at 2373-74. Patterson did not assert a claim
for racial discrimination in the "making" of her employment contract, presumably because the stat-
ute of limitations on such a claim had expired. Therefore, Patterson presented little evidence to
show McLean's intent when McLean hired Patterson. See supra note 12. The Patterson Court indi-
cated that the only value in a § 1981 claim of proving on-the-job racial harassment is to support a
claim for either a racially motivated hiring or promotion decision. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2374,
2378.
163. Because the Court interpreted the statute literally, there is no room to argue that protecting
the conditions of employment is implicit in either the making or enforcing contracts language.
164. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2374 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982)); see also Rogers v.
EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) ("One can readily envision working environments so
heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stabil-
ity of minority group workers, and . . . Title VII was aimed at the eradication of such noxious
practices."), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
165. Id. at 2375. An example of a situation in which overlap necessarily would occur would be
when an employer refused to hire a black applicant on the basis of race. Id.; see, e.g., Boudreaux v.
Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971) (black longshoremen not hired
for supervisory positions).
166. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2374. In deciding not to overrule Runyon, the majority had rea-
soned that a "sound construction" of § 1981 would not frustrate the Title VII conciliation proce-
dures. Id. at 2371; see supra note 155.
In dissent, Brennan challenged the majority's concern that a broadened interpretation of § 1981
would undermine the conciliation procedures in Title VII. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2390 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Brennan asserted that Congress was well aware of the use of § 1981 as an alternative
remedy to Title VII when it rejected an amendment to make Title VII the exclusive remedial scheme
for employment discrimination. Id. at 2386-87, 2390 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Congress recognized
that § 1981 "'protects similar rights [to Title VII] but involves fewer technical prerequisites to the
filing of an action.'" Id. at 2390 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 118 CONG. REc. - (1972)),
Nevertheless, Congress concluded that an employee who has been discriminated against " 'should be
accorded every protection that the law has in its purview, and ... the person should not be forced to
seek his remedy in only one place.'" Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 118 CONG. REC, 3371-72
(1972)); see also infra note 174 (further discussion of the proposed amendment).
167. The court of appeals had stated, "Claims of racially discriminatory hiring, firing, and pro-
motion go to the very existence and nature of the employment contract and thus fall easily within §
1981's protection." Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th Cir. 1986) (em-
phasis added), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
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section 1981, the type of promotion involved must represent a change in position
such that the employee enters into a new contract with the employer.16 8 Be-
cause the Court concluded that the jury was improperly instructed on Patter-
son's burden of proof in her promotion claim, 169 Patterson's promotion claim
was remanded for further proceedings. 170
The Court concluded its opinion with an assurance that it was not retreat-
ing from congressional policy to forbid private, as well as public, discrimina-
tion.17 1 Instead, the Court claimed that Congress' actions and omissions
constrained its interpretations. 172
Justice Brennan began his dissent: "What the Court declines to snatch
away with one hand, it takes with the other. Though the Court today reaffirms
§ 1981's applicability to private conduct, it simultaneously gives this landmark
civil rights statute a needlessly cramped interpretation." 173 After defending the
result in Runyon, 174 Justice Brennan turned to address the scope of section
168. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2377. "Only where the promotion rises to the level of an opportu-
nity for a new and distinct relation between the employee and the employer is such a claim actiona-
ble under § 1981." Id. (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) (claim for denial of
admission to law firm partnership cognizable under Title VII)).
In dissent, Justice Brennan stated that the majority's test to determine whether a promotion
claim is actionable under § 1981 was too restrictive. Id. at 2394 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan was concerned that a test that requires a promotion claim to represent a new contract
opportunity would allow an employer to deny numerous promotions solely on the basis of race by
carefully ensuring that promotions do not involve new contracts. Id. at 2395 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Brennan admitted, however, that use of this tactic to avoid discrimination suits under
§ 1981 would be difficult because a "'promotion' . . . would seem to imply different duties and
employment terms," thereby requiring a new contract. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see infra
note 227 for subsequent interpretations of the Court's test.
169. The Court concluded that the district court erred in requiring Patterson to prove she was
better qualified than the person promoted. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2377. The Court commented that
this would be but one method of showing that the employer's defense-that it gave the job to the
white employee because she was better qualified-was not its true reason. Id. at 2378. Patterson
also could establish that McLean's stated reasons were pretextual by presenting evidence of past
discriminatory treatment of her, including incidents of racial harassment and failure to train her for
a higher-level position. Id. Justice Brennan agreed with the Court's decision to remand Patterson's
promotion claim. Id. at 2394 (Brennan, J., diksenting). The Court, however, did not determine
whether Patterson's showing was sufficient to satisfy her burden of proof.
170. Id. at 2379.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
174. Although the majority decided not to address the issue, Justice Brennan argued thatthe
decision in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), was correct. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2380-85
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan summarized the legislative history and the judicial reason-
ing in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2380-83 (Brennan,
J., dissenting); see also Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment (Ch. VI, The Supreme Court and the Thirteenth Amendment in the Modern Era), 12 Hous. L.
REV. 844, 844-54 (1975) (discussion of the Jones case); supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text
(same).
Justice Brennan noted that the Court had indicated on two occasions that § 1981 applied to
private contracts before it addressed the issue in depth in Runyon. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2383
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975);
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 440 (1973)). The primary dispute
between the majority and the dissent in Runyon, which the Supreme Court resurrected in Patterson,
concerned the origin of § 1981. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting); see supra notes 122-28 and accompany-
ing text; see also Buchanan, supra note 50, at 331-46 (detailed look at the legislative history of the
Reconstruction Congress). Justice Brennan agreed with the Runyon majority that the Court should
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1981. He criticized the Court for not analyzing the history of section 1981
not attribute to Congress" 'an intent to repeal a major piece of Reconstruction legislation' "without
a clearer expression of such intent. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2384 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Runyon, 427 U.S. at 169 n.8).
Justice Brennan then argued that Congress by its silence had in effect ratified the Supreme
Court's interpretation of § 1981. Id. at 2385-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted:
"[W]e have often taken Congress' subsequent inaction as probative to varying degrees, depending
upon the circumstances, of its acquiescence." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice
Brennan listed numerous recent examples of instances in which Congress acted to overrule Supreme
Court interpretations of civil rights statutes. Id. at 2385 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting). These exam-
ples included the following: Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-559, 90
Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)) (overturning Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilder-
ness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)); Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)) (overturning General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S, 125
(1976)); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 95 Stat. 131 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (1982)) (overturning Mobile v. Bolden, 466 U.S. 55 (1980)); Handicapped Children's
Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(e)(4)(B)- (G)
(1988)) (overturning Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984)); Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,
Pub. L. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (note following 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988)) (overturning Grove City
College V. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984)). Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2385 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan argued that Congress' failure to overturn Runyon supported his view that the deci-
sion itself was correct. Id. at 2385 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
A significant number of legislators urged the Court not to reverse Runyon in their amici curiae
brief to the present case:
Runyon's reasoning and holding have not been undercut by subsequent legal develop-
ments. No decision rendered by this Court has questioned the continuing vitality of the
interpretation of section 1981 adopted there. On the contrary, this Court has repeatedly
and without exception treated Runyon as well-settled law. The Executive Branch has also
consistently supported the interpretation of section 1981 adopted in Runyon, and no devel-
opments in the Congress have eroded the reasoning of Runyon. Indeed ... the Congress.
has convincingly demonstrated that it fully agrees with Runyon's interpretation of section
1981.
Brief of 66 Members of the United States Senate and 118 Members of the United States House of
Representatives asAmici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 15-16, Patterson (No. 87-107) (footnotes
omitted) [hereinafter Senate and House Brief]. The legislators explained that recreating the holding
in Runyon through legislation could be impossible:
Amici's concern for the viability of Runyon's interpretation of section 1981 is not less-
ened by the fact that the Congress may legislatively alter a statutory interpretation of the
Court. Any congressional effort to change a decision of this Court could prove divisive and
time consuming, could well be delayed by disagreement over collateral issues, and could
confront grave difficulties in addressing the nuances that have arisen from case-by-case
elaboration of the statute. But with regard to one of the core civil rights statutes, the costs
are far greater. To require Congress to revisit this issue could jeopardize the closure and
repose that we have obtained as a Nation on the issue of racial discrimination. If the Court
overturns Runyon, intentional racial discrimination that is now illegal could exist for years
without remedy, while the Congress debates the scope and details of new legislation.
Id. at 5-6.
Justice Brennan also believed that Congress' rejection of an amendment to the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunities Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 5108, 5314-16 (1988); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-1 to e-6, 2000e-8, 2000e-9, 2000e-13 to e-17
(1982)), that would have made Title VII the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination, was
an expression of Congress' approval of Runyon. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2386-87 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). Indicating that § 1981 overlapped with the Equal Employment Opportunities Act by cov-
ering private employment discrimination, Senator Hruska proposed an amendment that would have
made Title VII the exclusive remedy after the 1972 amendment. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing
118 CONG. REc. 3168-69, 3172 (1972)). Senator Williams spoke out against the amendment, citing
the Supreme Court's policy concerns in Jones. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing 118 CONG. Rnc.
3171-72 (1972)). Both the Senate and House defeated the 1972 amendment. Id. (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (citing 118 CONG. REC. 3964-65 (1972); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 899, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972)). The Court in Runyon considered the failure of the amendment to be a "clear[] indication of
congressional agreement with the view that Section 1981 does reach private acts of racial discrimina-
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before determining that it does not cover a claim for racial harassment. 175
Looking at the legislative history, Justice Brennan concluded that the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 "was also designed to protect the freedman from the imposi-
tion of working conditions that evidence an intent on the part of the employer
not to contract on non-discriminatory terms."' 176 In Justice Brennan's view, the
"to make" contracts language "is quite naturally read as extending to cover
postformation conduct that demonstrates that the contract was not really made
on equal terms at all." 177 He acknowledged that the language in section 1981
places a limit on the type of harassment claims that are actionable, but he pro-
posed a test that asks "whether the acts constituting harassment were sufficiently
severe or pervasive as effectively to belie any claim that the contract was entered
into in a racially neutral manner."' 178 Justice Brennan argued that the jury
could have concluded that Patterson's evidence of racial harassment was suffi-
tion." Runyon, 427 U.S. at 175. Contra Maltz, supra note 5, at 859 & n.10; Eskridge, Interpreting
Legislative Inaction, 87 MicH. L. Ruv. 67, 100-03 (1988).
Justice Brennan also found evidence of Congress' approval of Runyon in a statute authorizing
an award of attorney's fees in civil rights cases, including § 1981 cases. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2387-
88 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-
559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)); accord Eskridge, supra, at 121. But see
Maltz, supra note 5, at 859-60 (no implicit approval). Justice Brennan concluded that "[o]verruling
Runyon would be flatly inconsistent with this expression of congressional intent." Patterson, 109 S.
Ct. at 2388 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
175. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2388 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan called the Court's
use of Title VII "anachronistic" because "the Reconstruction Congress would [not] have viewed...
a federal civil rights statute passed nearly a century later, as the primary basis for challenging private
discrimination." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
176. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan derived this conclusion from examples re-
ported in the Schurz Report on plantation owners' treatment of former slaves in an effort to keep
them oppressed. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Schurz Report, S. ExEc. Doc. No. 2, 39th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1865)); see supra notes 41 & 44.
177. Id. at 2388-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 2389 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy in the majority opinion responded to
Justice Brennan's views with disfavor. Justice Kennedy stated that "[t]he fact that racial harassment
is 'severe or pervasive' does not by magic transform a challenge to the conditions of employment, not
actionable under § 1981, into a viable challenge to the employer's refusal to make a contract." Id. at
2376. In the majority's view, racial harassment may support a claim that the "explicit" unfavorable
terms of a contract were due to racial animus by the employer only "at the time of the formation of
the contract." Id. at 2376-77 (emphasis in original). The Court refused to allow a plaintiff "to
bootstrap" a flawed claim into an actionable one on the basis of its severity. Id.
Justice Brennan argued that there should be no distinction between the case in which the em-
ployer tells the prospective employee that he or she must accept racial harassment in the workplace
as part of the job, and the case in which the employer does not express his contractual expectations,
but the employee is in fact subjected to racial harassment. Id. at 2389 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens dissented separately to give his views on whether a claim for racial harassment is
encompassed in § 1981's protections. Id. at 2395 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also did
not agree with the Court's requirement that the discriminatory intent be "explicit" at the time the
contract was made. Id. at 2395 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens believed that an employer
who conceals his discriminatory intent, but later intentionally harasses and insults the employee,
should not be treated differently from an employer who makes his intentions known at the time the
employee is hired. Id. at 2395-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Justice Steven's view, an at-will em-
ployee is constantly remaking his or her employment contract as new duties are assigned to the
employee. Id. at 2396 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The contract is "evidence of a vital, ongoing relation-
ship between human beings." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens viewed the onslaught of
racial harassment as the imposition of an unequal contractual term. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens concluded that "[a] deliberate policy of harassment... [is] manifest discrimination in
the making of contracts... [as] that concept was interpreted in Runyon v. McCrary." Id. (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
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ciently severe and extensive to establish that she had been "denied the right to
make an employment contract on the same basis as white employees of the
credit union." 179
In Patterson the Supreme Court ignored the spirit of Jones that Congress
exercised its broad powers under the thirteenth amendment in enacting the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 to ensure practical freedom to all, regardless of race. 180 Sec-
tion 1981's legislative history clearly illustrates that the 1866 Congress was
aware of the racially discriminatory treatment of laborers by landowners1 8' and
believed that the Act would prohibit all discrimination under the enumerated
rights, including the right to contract.182 Although the language in section 1981
is narrow, its intended scope was broad.
The Patterson Court also failed to follow the Jones line of cases, which
broadly construed the definitions of the rights enumerated in section 1982, sec-
tion 1981's sister statute. The Court has found that the term "to lease" in sec-
tion 1982 prohibits racial discrimination in the use of ancillary recreational
facilities. 183 On several occasions the Court has indicated that section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, the origin of both section 1981 and section 1982,
should be construed broadly.184 The Court also has been willing to extend the
179. Id. at 2393 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan further recognized that § 1981 ap.
plies to all contracts, not just employment contracts. According to Justice Brennan, "[t]he lower
federal courts have found a broad variety of claims of contractual discrimination cognizable under
§ 1981." Id. at 2390 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan cited the following cases to support
this proposition: Wyatt v. Security Inn Food & Beverage, Inc., 819 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1987) (hotel
bar's racially discriminatory application of policy to eject persons who do not order drinks); Hall v.
Bio-Medical Applications, Inc., 671 F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1982) (medical facility's racially discrimina-
tory refusal to treat black patient); Hall v. Pennslyvannia State Police, 570 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1978)
(bank's policy to offer services on different terms depending on race); Cody v. Union Elec., 518 F.2d
978 (8th Cir. 1975) (utility's racially discriminatory policy on the amount of security deposit re-
quired to obtain service); Howard Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 516 F. Supp. 508 (D.
Md. 1981) (hospital's racially discriminatory award of service contract); Grier v. Specialized Skills,
Inc., 326 F. Supp. 856 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (barber school's racially discriminatory admissions policy);
Scott v. Young, 307 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D. Va. 1969) (amusement park's racially discriminatory ad-
missions policy), aff'd, 421 F.2d 143 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970). Patterson, 109 S.
Ct. at 2390 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, a restrictive interpretation of § 1981 would eliminate
remedies "in a host of contractual situations to which Title VII does not extend." Id. at 2391 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 94-95. It is logical to assume that Congress intended the
phrase "to make contracts" to have a broad meaning. Given that the statute protects substantive
rights, rather than just conferring legal capacity on freedmen, a narrow construction of the words
chosen by Congress does not cohere with the remedial goals of the statute.
181. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. During the 1866 Act debates, Representative
Windom expressly stated that the Act guaranteed laborers "the means of holding and enjoying the
proceeds of their toil." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1159 (1866); see supra text accompany-
ing note 45. Representative Lawrence further stated that "[lit is a mockery to say that a citizen may
have a right to live, and yet deny him the right to make a contract to secure the privilege and the
rewards of labor." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1833 (1866); see supra note 45. These
expressions indicate an intent to proscribe racial discrimination that arises after the formation of the
employment contract. Even the Jones Court concluded that § 1981 protects against racial discrimi-
nation in the performance of a contract. See supra text accompanying note 96. Two contemporane-
ous interpretations of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 by Supreme Court Justices on circuit also
effectuated the goals of the 1866 Congress. See supra note 46.
183. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 437 (1973); Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236-37 (1969); see supra note 101 and accompanying text.
184. City of 1 lemphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 120 (1981); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88,
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protections of sections 1981 and 1982 to Jews and Arabs, holding that these
were "distinct races" at the time the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was adopted. 85
Not only has the Court construed section 1982 broadly, but, over the last quar-
ter-century, it has rejected the type of stilted, literal construction of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 that the Patterson Court followed. 186 Because the Court
consistently has interpreted section 1981 and section 1982 to have the same
reach,187 the Patterson Court should have relied on these cases as precedent to
construe broadly the "to make contracts" language in section 1981 to include
any racially motivated interference with the performance of a contract. 188 The
Patterson Court chose instead to limit the phrase to its literal meaning in an
unprecedented way.
The Patterson Court's refusal to extend section 1981's protections to con-
duct that occurs after the formation of a contract is also inconsistent with the
Court's prior holdings under section 1982. The Court has redressed racial dis-
crimination that began after the transfer of property under the language "to
lease" and "to sell" in section 1982.189 The Court phrased the broad protection
concept by stating that the posttransfer benefits were infused "into the bundle of
rights for which an individual pays when buying or leasing."' 190 By the same
logic, the benefits of an employment contract, such as conditions of employment,
97 (1971) (citing Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237; Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968);
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)); see supra texts accompanying notes 102 & 104.
185. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617-18 (1987) (extending § 1982); Saint
Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (extending § 1981); see supra note 104.
Once again the Court did not limit its construction of the 1866 Act to the face of the statute, but was
willing to consider the "'events and passions of the time in which the law was forged.'" General
Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvannia, 458 U.S. 375, 386 (1982) (quoting Price, 383 U.S. at 803);
see supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
186. Dissenting justices have tried unsuccessfully to limit the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to provide
only legal capacity to contract or buy and sell property. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 192-
95 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,449 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); supra notes 115-28 and accompanying text. A legal capacity limitation would have been
consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretations of the civil rights statutes during the period 1873
to 1906. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text. During that period the Court was reluctant
to conclude that the Civil Rights Acts had any substantive protections for fear of encroaching on
state sovereignty. Id. This period is commonly known as the laissez-faire era as a result of these
federalism concerns. J. SCHMIDHAUSER, supra note 56, at 252 (marking period from 1873 to 1937);
see also GOLDMAN, CONsTrITUTIONAL LAW AND SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING 159-320
(1982) (referring to the period beginning 1873 through 1936 as "The Conservative Era").
187. The Runyon Court indicated that § 1981's reach was equivalent to § 1982's reach. Runyon,
427 U.S. at 170-73; see supra note 110 and accompanying text.
188. The Court has repeatedly used the concept of "racially motivated interference" as did the
Reconstruction Congress, to describe the conduct that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibited. See,
e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 662 (1987); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recrea-
tional Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 434 (1973); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236-37
(1969); supra note 104; texts accompanying notes 44, 45 & 95; infra text accompanying note 194.
This language is clearly broad enough to encompass a claim for racial harassment. For discussion of
racial harassment claims under Title VII, see supra note 145.
189. In Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 236-37, the Court held that after a nondiscriminatory lease had
been created by the lessor and lessee, a third party could interfere with the lessee's right "to lease" by
refusing to allow the lessee to use community recreational facilities. See supra note 101. In Tillman,
410 U.S. at 434, the Court reached the same result when a black man purchased a house in a
community and was denied membership in the community recreational facilities. See supra note
101.
190. Tillman, 410 U.S. at 434.
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promotion, and protection from unjustified discharge, are infused into the mak-
ing of an employment contract. In light of the Patterson Court's deviation from
Jones and its progeny, Patterson brings into question the continued viability of
the broad protection conferred in claims under section 1982.
The Court justified its limitation by arguing that section 1981 primarily
protects only the right to contract, rather than intangible rights arising after the
contract's formation. 191 The Patterson Court's justification stands in sharp con-
trast to Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 192 in which the Supreme Court held that
section 1981 has a broader focus than protecting contractual rights because it
191. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2372; see supra text accompanying notes 157-58. The Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Patterson also had relied on an economic versus intangible rights distinction
by citing United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 631 (W.D.N.Y. 1978). Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th Cir. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 109 S. Ct.
2363 (1989). The Court has previously concluded that both economic and intangible rights are
protected by § 1982. In City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 123 (1981), the Court indicated
that the petitioners could prove the street closing constituted a badge or incident of slavery by look-
ing either at the economic consequences due to property depreciation or the intangible consequences
due to personal frustration. Id.; see supra note 104.
192. 482 U.S. 656 (1987). In Goodman black employees alleged that their employer had violated
§ 1981 by discharging employees during their probationary period, tolerating racial harassment by
employees, and making discriminatory job assignment, promotion, and incentive pay decisions. Id.
at 659-60. The district court found that the employer's conduct constituted discrimination. Id. at
659. The district court applied the six-year statute of limitations governing claims on contracts,
replevin, and trespass. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed on the ground that
the two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injuries barred the claims against the em-
ployer. Id. at 660.
Embracing a narrow interpretation of§ 1981, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals'
use of the shorter statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Id. at 663-64. The Court rejected
the employees' argument that the six-year statute for interference with contractual rights should
apply because § 1981 expressly involves contract claims and primarily deals with economic rights.
Id. at 661-62. The majority made its conclusion over a vigorous dissent by Justice Brennan, who wasjoined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun. Justice Brennan contended that although the statute
guaranteed "numerous rights other than equal treatment in the execution, administration, and the
enforcement of contracts] ... [it] was primarily intended, and has been most frequently utilized, to
remedy injury to a narrower category of contractual or economic rights." Id. at 671-72 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Brennan, however, did not indicate a narrow scope for § 1981: "Section 1981 banned
racial discrimination in contractual relations, whether individuals were expressly or constructively
denied the right to contract because of race, or were provided a lessor opportunity than others, in the
form of less favorable contract terms or unequal treatment, discouraging entry into contractual rela-
tions." Id. at 673 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Brennan believed that the
type of racial discrimination claim made under § 1981 should determine the applicable statute of
limitations. Id. at 677 (Brennan, J., dissenting). If the § 1981 claim represents a tort action such as
assault or infliction of emotional distress, the Court should apply the personal injury statute of limi-
tations. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Alternatively, if the claim more closely resembles a contract
action, the statute of limitations for interference with contractual relations should apply. Id. (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
In Goodman the black employees also brought charges against labor unions, which were obli-
gated to process grievances under collective-bargaining agreements, for refusing to process their ra-
cial discrimination grievances. Id. at 664. The district court found the unions liable under § 1981
and the court of appeals affirmed. Id. The unions appealed the judgment against them on the
grounds that the employees had failed to prove intentional discrimination by the unions. Id. at 665.
Although the Supreme Court conceded that there was no proof that the unions held any "racial
animus against or denigrated blacks generally," the Court concluded that the conduct of the unions
in refusing to process the employees' racial discrimination grievances "intentionally discriminated
against blacks seeking a remedy for disparate treatment based on their race and violated... § 1981."
Id. at 669.
Although the Court did not use the express terminology of § 1981, the Court implicitly found
that the unions had violated § 1981's "to enforce" contracts provision. See id. The majority in
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was designed to protect civil rights.193 The Goodman Court concluded that sec-
tion 1981 "guarantee[s] the personal right to engage in economically significant
activity free from racially discriminatory interference."1 94 The performance of
an employment contract undoubtedly is an "economically significant activity."
The Patterson majority choose to ignore Goodman's characterization of section
1981 as having a broader fundamental rights purpose in order to effectuate their
goal of narrowing section 1981 even further.195
The Patterson Court supported its decision not to interpret section 1981
broadly on the ground that claims for racial harassment in the workplace are
"more naturally governed by state contract law." 19 6 The argument that state
law provides relief for Patterson's claim of racial harassment 197 is reminiscent of
the federalism concerns that the nineteenth-century Court used to emasculate
the civil rights scheme. 19 8 The Court rejected the notion that respect for state.
sovereignty requires federal caution in the area of private racial discrimination
more than twenty years ago in Jones.199 Congress already has created, through
Patterson also concluded the unions' conduct in Goodman violated the "to enforce contracts" clause
of § 1981. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373; see supra note 161 and accompanying text.
193. The Goodman Court stated that "[s]ection 1981 has a much broader focus than contractual
rights.... Its heading was and is 'Equal rights under the law' and is contained in a chapter entitled
'Civil Rights.'" Goodman, 482 U.S. at 661. The Court noted that the statute is part of "a federal
law barring racial discrimination, which . . .,is a fundamental injury to the individual rights of a
person." Id.
194. Id. at 662.
195. The Goodman majority manipulated the characterization of § 1981 so that it could select
the shorter personal injury statute of limitations. The arguments of both the majority and the dis-
sent are unquestionably result oriented. See supra note 192. In light of the Patterson Court's limita-
tion of § 1981's reach to the formation of a contract and its legal enforcement, an even stronger
argument can now be made that the contractual statute of limitations should apply.
Goodman actually involved claims for racial harassment under § 1981. Goodman, 482 U.S. at
660. Although the viability of a § 1981 racial harassment claim was not before the Court in Good-
man, the Court never indicated that a separate claim for racial harassment was not possible under
§ 1981. See id. at 660-69.
196. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373; see supra text accompanying note 159.
197. The Patterson Court stated:
[C]onduct amounting to a breach of contract under state law is precisely what the language
of § 1981 does not cover . . . [because] the plaintiff is free to enforce the terms of the
contract in state court, and cannot possibly assert, by reason of the breach alone, that he
has been deprived of the same right to enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens.
Id. at 2376. The Court refused to "federalize all state-law claims for breach of contract where racial
animus is alleged, since § 1981 covers all types of contracts, not just employment contracts." Id.
198. See Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906). Hodges held that the federal courts did not
have jurisdiction over a claim for assault or trespass under § 1981. Id. at 17-18; see supra notes 70 &
72.
199. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441-43 & n.78 (1968) (overruling Hodges to
the extent it is inconsistent with Jones' broad holding); see supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
One treatise dates the abandonment of the Supreme Court's federalism concerns to the earlier case of
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). D. BRAVEMAN & W. BANKS, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: STRUCTURE AND RIGHTS IN OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM 244 (1987). This treatise states that
Brown "provided impetus to the federal courts as the primary guardians of federal constitutional
rights .... [so that] [b]y the late 1960's the Supreme Court had fairly established the precept that the
federal courthouse doors were to be open for individuals seeking to enforce constitutional rights."
Id.
Consistent with this view, the Court in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), held that
Congress has the power to provide federal civil relief to the victims of racially motivated torts. Id. at
101-03. Plaintiffs in Griffin alleged that Defendants detained, assaulted, and battered them on the
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Title VII, a federal forum for racial harassment in employment cases. There-
fore, there is no reason to exclude section 1981 claims from federal jurisdiction.
Indeed, the majority of claims under section 1981 for employment discrimina-
tion are made in conjunction with claims under Title VII.2°°
In addition, state contract and tort law does not provide an adequate rem-
edy for injured plaintiffs in Patterson's position. Most states would not treat a
racially motivated employment termination as a breach of contract.20 1 There-
fore, plaintiffs must resort to bringing claims under state tort law, such as claims
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, which are difficult to prove202 and
thus create no incentive for an employer to discourage racial harassment by one
employee against another. One alternative form of state tort law relief was sug-
gested by the Seventh Circuit in Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. 20 3 The Hunter
court treated the section 1981 claim for racial harassment in the workplace like
a tort claim and held that an employer could be liable for a tort committed by
one employee against another if it failed to provide a work environment reason-
ably free from racial harassment. 2°4 Future plaintiffs should consider this ap-
proach in state court.
The Patterson Court also argued that Title VII was a more appropriate
source of relief for Patterson's racial harassment claim.20 5 The relief provided
by Title VII, however, is inadequate because the plaintiff's recovery is limited to
two years' backpay, and actual and punitive damages are not available. 20 6 Rein-
statement for discriminatory discharge and an injunction against future discrim-
ination also are available under Title VII,20 7 but these remedies require an
employee to return to an environment in which she has been mistreated. The
stigma of such treatment is hard for an employee to overcome, let alone return
to, particularly when the employee has found subsequent employment in an en-
vironment free from racial discrimination.
The Court also found support for its decision in the conciliation scheme
under Title VII, which would be severely undermined by a broad interpretation
basis of their race. Id. at 90-92. The suit was brought under § 1985(3), which prohibits conspiracies
to deprive any person of the equal protection of the laws. Id. at 92 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
(1982)). Although state law created the right to be free from intentionally tortious conduct, the
Court in effect recognized an independent substantive right under federal law because the tortious
conduct stemmed from a racially motivated private conspiracy. Buchanan, supra note 174, at 865.
Jones, Brown, and Griffin indicate that federalism concerns do not justify the Patterson result.
200. Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 6, at 603 (In a study of three federal districts, out of 174
§ 1981 claims, 133 were brought in conjunction with Title VII claims.). In addition, state law claims
for intentional infliction of emotional distress for racial harassment in the workplace can be brought
in federal court as pendent to claims under Title VII. See supra note 19.
201. See supra note 160.
202. Consistent with North Carolina case precedent, the district court in Patterson held that the
facts alleged in support of Patterson's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress were not
sufficiently outrageous to warrant relief. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2369; see supra notes 19 & 21.
203. 797 F.2d 1417 (7th Cir. 1986).
204. Id. at 1422; see supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
205. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373; see supra text accompanying note 159.
206. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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of section 1981.208 Although it is true that Patterson's claim could have been
brought under Title VII, mere overlap of the statutory provisions should not
result in a restrictive reading of section 1981. The Court on several occasions
has addressed the effect of twentieth-century statutory enactments on nine-
teenth-century civil rights statutes and concluded that the new legislation does
not replace the old remedial scheme unless it expressly calls for repeal. 20 9 That
an employee can bring suit under state law for intentional infliction of emotional
distress caused by an employer without resort to the administrative remedies
2 10
further undermines the majority's concern that a broad reading of section 1981
would weaken Title VII's conciliation procedures. 2 11 Clearly there is overlap
between such tort claims and Title VII.
The Court expressly rejected the view that overlap of section 1981 and Title
VII created a problem in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency.2 12 The Johnson
Court held that the statute of limitations on a claim under section 1981 is not
tolled by timely filing of an administrative claim under Title VII.2 13 The John-
son Court recognized that such a result would encourage an employee to bring
suit under section 1981 before or during the time the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) is engaged in conciliation efforts, thereby deterring
conciliation and voluntary compliance. 2 14 The Court in Johnson, however,
concluded:
[T]hese are the natural effects of the choice Congress has made available
208. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2374-75; see supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
209. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 174 & n. 11 (1976) (considering and rejecting any
possible conflict of § 1981 with Title VII); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237-38
(1969) (considering and rejecting any possible conflict of § 1982 with Public Accommodations Act
of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6
(1982)); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413-17 (1968) (considering and rejecting any
possible conflict of § 1982 with Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606 (1982)).
210. See, eg., Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 79 N.C. App. 483, 340 S.E.2d 116 (1986).
211. Essentially, a claim for racial harassment in the workplace under § 1981 is a federalized
version of the state cause of action. See supra note 197; see also Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797
F.2d 1417 (7th Cir. 1986) (court treated § 1981 racial harassment claim like tort claim). For a
discussion of Hunter, see supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text. The elements of an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim under North Carolina law are that the defendant engaged in
"(1) extreme, outrageous conduct, (2) intended to cause, and causing (3) severe emotional distress."
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1146 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing Dickens v. Puryear,
302 N.C. 437, 452, 276 S.E.2d 325, 335 (1981)), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
The requirement that § 1981 racial harassment claims must be severe and pervasive embodies these
state law policies. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
212. 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975).
213. Id. at 462-67.
214. Id. at 461. Several lower federal courts have concluded that a plaintiff can bypass the
EEOC administrative procedures and bring suit directly under § 1981. See Brady v. Bristol-Meyers,
Inc., 459 F.2d 621, 623-24 (8th Cir. 1972); Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044, 1046
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1972); Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d
757, 761 (3d Cir. 1971); Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011, 1016-17
(5th Cir. 1971); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097, 1100-01 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 948 (1971). But cf. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476, 487 (7th Cir.) (ag-
grieved person must plead a reasonable excuse for not exhausting EEOC remedies before bringing
suit under § 1981), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970); Howard v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 372 F.
Supp. 854, 857-58 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (allowing a § 1981 claim interferes with Title VII conciliation
procedures).
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to the claimant by its conferring upon him independent administrative
and judicial remedies. The choice is a valuable one. Under some cir-
cumstances, the administrative route may be highly preferred over the
litigatory; under others, the reverse may be true.21 5
Patterson itself demonstrates that the EEOC procedures do not always result in
voluntary compliance and are often time-consuming. 216
More important than Patterson's effect on employment claims that fall
within Title VII's protection is its effect on contract relations not covered by
Title VII or other comprehensive statutes. The EEOC unofficially estimates that
approximately 10.7 million employees and 86.3 percent of employers do not fall
within Title VII's scope,2 17 which excludes employers with fewer than fifteen
employees. 218 Patterson leaves these employees without a federal remedy for ra-
cial harassment. In addition, section 1981 applies to racial discrimination in
many nonemployment contracts. 219 For example, section 1981 covers racial dis-
crimination in the making and enforcement of contracts to attend private
schools.220 The Court has expressly recognized the legislative and executive
branches' fundamental and overriding interest in eradication of racial discrimi-
nation, particularly in education. 22' Applying Patterson in the private school
context would permit the school to segregate students based on race, so long as
it admitted them on an equal basis. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Patterson,
doubted that the decision in Runyon "would have been different if the school
had agreed to allow the black students to attend, but subjected them to segre-
gated classes and other racial abuse."'222
The Patterson majority's holding that "to make contracts" does not encom-
pass postformation conduct, such as a breach of contract,223 suggests that a
215, Johnson, 421 U.S. at 461. The Johnson Court noted that Congress had emphasized that
§ 1981 remedies are separate and independent from Title VII. Id. The Court stated: "We are disin-
cdined ... to infer any positive preference for one over the other, without a more definite expression
in the legislation Congress has enacted, as, for example, a proscription of a § 1981 action while an
EEOC claim is pending." Id.
216. The record of the case indicates that Brenda Patterson pursued her administrative remedies
before bringing suit. She received a right to sue letter on June 30, 1983, one year after leaving the
employ of McLean Credit Union. Brief for Respondent at 7, Patterson (No. 87-107); see supra notes
78 & 82.
217. Eisenburg & Schwab, supra note 6, at 602.
218. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982); see, e.g., Carter v. Duncan-Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225, 1228
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (court found liability for racial harassment under § 1981 because Title VII did not
apply to racial harassment by small employers). For discussion of Carter, see supra notes 136-39 and
accompanying text.
219. See supra note 179; see also Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 6, at 601 (in sample popula-
tion, employment claims comprised 77.4%, police misconduct claims comprised 11.5%, housing or
zoning claims comprised 3.6%, schools claims comprised .8%, other contract claims comprised
.8%, and other and unidentified claims comprised 6.0% of § 1981 suits).
220. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976); see supra texts accompanying notes 107 &
Ill.
221. See, eg., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592-96 (1983); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954).
222. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2396 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373; see supra text accompanying note 157. The Reconstruction
Congress clearly was trying to remedy the landowners' failure to pay wages under valid contracts.
See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. This type of conduct ordinarily is considered a breach
of contract.
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claim for a racially motivated discharge is not cognizable under section 1981.224
Lower federal courts have recognized section 1981 constructive discharge claims
for many years.2 25 A claim for discriminatory discharge, however, would con-
tradict the holding in Patterson. Therefore, the impact of the Patterson decision
on redressing racial discrimination is far greater than its express holding.226 In-
deed, the Patterson Court's literal construction of the term "to make contracts"
precludes a claim for discrimination at any stage other than the actual formation
of the contract.22
7
A pressing question after Patterson is how much further the Court's con-
servative majority will go to emasculate the nineteenth-century civil rights statu-
tory scheme. 228 The 1883 holding of the Civil Rights Cases Court that social
prejudices cannot be regulated federally has long since been abandoned by the
Court and by society.229 Although the 1866 Congress thought that it had cre-
224. See Review of Supreme Court's Term, 58 U.S.L.W. 3065, 3065 (August 8, 1989) ("Employ-
ment discrimination claims may still be asserted against private employers under 42 U.S.C. 1981, but
only with respect to actions involving the making or enforcement of contracts, and not racial harass-
ment or, apparently, race-based discharges.").
225. A constructive discharge claim arises when racially discriminatory treatment forces the
employee to quit her job. See, eg., Martin v. Citibank, 762 F.2d 212, 221 (7th Cir. 1985); Irving v.
Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 172 (10th Cir. 1982); Muller v. U.S. Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923,
929 (10th Cir. 1975); Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 504 (7th Cir. 1974).
226. Subsequent to the decision in Patterson, many lower federal courts concluded that a dis-
charge claim is not cognizable under § 1981. See, e.g., Overby v. Chevron USA, Inc., 884 F.2d 470,
473 (9th Cir. 1989); Brown v. Avon Prods., Inc., No. 88 C 4459 (N.D. III. Oct. 2, 1989) (LEXIS
Genfed library, Dist. file) (dictum)); Busch v. Pizza Hut, Inc., No. 88 C 8241 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28,
1989) (LEXIS Genfed library, Dist. file); Crader v. Concordia College, 724 F. Supp. 558, 562 (N.D.
I1. 1989); Morgan v. Kansas City Area Transp. Auth., 720 F. Supp. 758, 759 (W.D. Miss. 1989).
But see Booth v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 675, 676 (D. Kan. 1989) (holding that discharge
claim not expressly excluded from § 1981 by Patterson); Rathjen v. Litchfield, 878 F.2d 836, 842
(5th Cir. 1989) (court noted in dictum that retaliatory discharge claim is cognizable under "to en-
force" contracts clause).
227. The Patterson majority further required that a promotion claim rise to the level of a new
contract opportunity before § 1981 would provide a remedy for a racially motivated denial of a
promotion. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2377; see supra note 168. The dissent's fear that this requirement
would be strictly interpreted has materialized since the decision in Patterson, as at least one federal
court has dismissed a promotion claim brought under § 1981 because it did not rise to a new and
distinct contract relationship. See Anderson v. United States Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 87 C 10637
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file). But see Mallory v. Booth Refrigeration
Supply Co., 882 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding promotion at issue sufficiently distinct; claim
dismissed on other grounds). For a discussion of two possible interpretations of the Patterson limita-
tion on promotion claims, see Malhorta v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1311 (7th Cir. 1989).
228. The Court decided two other cases in the same term as Patterson that also adversely affect
the nineteenth-century civil rights statutes. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702,
2722 (1989) (holding that plaintiff cannot bring a suit against a state actor under § 1981 unless the
plaintiff asserts and proves that § 1983 was violated); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S.
Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989) (holding that state officials are not persons under 42 U.S.C. § 1943 (1982);
therefore, state officials cannot be individually liable for racial discrimination).
229. The Court repeatedly has reaffirmed over the last quarter-century Justice Harlan's dissent-
ing view in the Civil Rights Cases that "blacks [cannot] be free from slavery until the practices which
brand[] them as inferior [are] eliminated." The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 36 (1883) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). The Court in Jones unequivocably accepted Justice Harlan's dissent as representing
both the views of the Court and the views of our society. Jones, 392 U.S. at 436-41; see supra notes
92-95 and accompanying text. As Justice Stevens recognized in his concurrence in Runyon, the
decision to construe the Civil Rights Act of 1866 broadly in Jones accords with the mores of our
society today. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 190 (Stevens, J., concurring). One commentator recognized that:
"Law follows society and cannot run contrary to the main streams of societal impulse and belief:
Even the Supreme Court recognized this in the late 1930's." A. MILLER, SOCIAL CHANGE AND
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ated a civil rights scheme that guaranteed freedom and equality, it failed to ex-
press those goals in a manner that could endure strict judicial construction.
Section 1981 was intended, and should have been interpreted, to include
postformation conduct in a contractual relationship. The Patterson Court's
strict constructionism is grossly inconsistent with the objective of Congress to
move constantly in the direction of eliminating racial discrimination in this
country.230 Once before, the Court's strict constructionism resulted in leaving
only "pitiful" civil rights protection.231 Congress responded by enacting five
new civil rights statutes to supplement the nineteenth-century statutes.232
Americans must now look to Congress to reverse the Supreme Court by creating
a statutory scheme that will deter discrimination in employment and education
effectively.233 Quick legislative action may prevent a complete emasculation of
civil rights legislation by the conservative majority.234
CYNTHIA GAIL SMITH
FUNDAMENTAL LAW 52 (1979) (dating the turning point as 1937); see also supra note 186 (discuss-
ing the Court's pre-1937 views on federalism).
230. See supra texts accompanying notes 114 & 221. The Patterson majority is inconsistent in its
decision not to overrule the extension of § 1981 to private contracts and its decision to narrow the
interpretation of § 1981's substantive protections. The Court decided not to overrule Runyon be-
cause the holding accorded with our society's deep commitment to end racial discrimination. See
supra note 155. The Court's narrow interpretation of § 1981, however, is in direct contrast to this
commitment.
231. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
233. There are at least two possible alternatives to achieve these goals. First, Congress could
amend § 1981 to include the performance of contracts. Such an amendment would effectuate the
original intent and should not meet with too great resistance as indicated by the previous rejection of
proposed amendments to make Title VII the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination. See
supra notes 81 & 174. Second, Congress could amend Title VII to allow suit for compensatory and
punitive damages. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. This approach would be ideal
because it would provide damages for discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin," not just racial discrimination as remedied by § 1981. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). For
this reason, however, amending Title VII would certainly meet with more resistance.
234. As noted by a significant number of Congressmen in their amici curiae brief in Patterson,
the possibility that Congress may legislatively alter a statutory interpretation of the Court does not
justify overruling prior Court precedent. Senate and House Brief, supra note 174, at 5-6. In fact,
Congress suggested that it may be impossible legislatively to recreate the Court's holdings because of
the difficulties of synergizing the case-by-case interpretations of the statute. Id. Even Congress ad-
monished the Patterson Court that requiring "Congress to revisit this issue could jeopardize the
closure and repose that we have obtained as a Nation on the issue of racial discrimination." Id,
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